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TAKING CONSCIENCE SERIOUSLY OR SERIOUSLY
TAKING CONSCIENCE?: OBSTETRICIANS,
SPECIALTY BOARDS, AND
THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
Michael A. Fragoso*
INTRODUCTION
A young woman visits her local obstetrician. She tells him that
she suspects, based on a home pregnancy test, that she is pregnant.
Unwed and scared, she hesitated before seeing a doctor. The obstetri-
cian examines her and tells her that she is, indeed, two months preg-
nant. The young woman says that she would like the pregnancy
terminated and asks him if he will perform the procedure. The doc-
tor, an observant Jew, informs her that had she visited sooner he
might have been able to accommodate her request (as his particular
religious beliefs do not attribute full human dignity to the embryo
until it has gestated for forty days), but at this stage in the pregnancy
he is unable to do so in good conscience, as that would involve the
taking of human life. Furthermore, uncomfortable participating
remotely in an abortion, the obstetrician does not refer the woman to
a specific alternate obstetrician; he instead assures her that there are
plenty of other nearby doctors who would be willing to perform the
procedure and that she should ask around.
Some time goes by and the obstetrician receives a letter at his
office giving him notice of a disciplinary hearing being held by the
American Board of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ABOG) in Dal-
las, Texas. The hearing involves allegations (made by the obstetrician
who ultimately performed the abortion on the young woman) that he
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violated the ethical standards of the American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists (ACOG). The letter says he did so by refusing
to refer the patient "in a timely manner" to another provider while
"deviating from standard medical practice." He travels to Dallas to
face the charges and is informed that ACOG ethical standards man-
date performance or referral in all "standard" aspects of "reproductive
healthcare" including the termination of pregnancy. The obstetrician
objects that he did nothing wrong and that he was simply following his
moral and religious convictions, as he always has. The board informs
him that such personal scruples are no excuse and that his ethical
duties as an obstetric specialist had been clearly defined in 2007 by
the College in Ethics Opinion No. 385 ("Ethics Opinion").' The
board revokes his Certificate (the primary obstetric credential), thus
terminating his status as a board certified obstetric surgeon.
The doctor returns home. Without his Certificate he loses his
hospital admitting privileges making it too risky for him to see obstet-
ric patients and driving down the demand for his services. Third party
payers are also preparing to terminate their contracts with him, citing
clauses mandating board certification, while both existing and poten-
tial patients are wary of seeing a specialist who is not board certified.
Having spent a career as an obstetric specialist he is uncomfortable
becoming a general practitioner, not having cultivated those skills for
decades. After college, medical school, four years of residency, and
decades as a practitioner, his once lucrative and socially beneficial
medical practice is reduced to the value of his examination tables and
filing cabinets.
While the facts are hypothetical, this scenario is entirely possible.
In recent years there has been a growing fault line within the medical
community on the rights of medical professionals to refuse participa-
tion in activities to which they have moral or religious objections.
Typically the line runs through so called "reproductive health," with
religious medical practitioners refusing to participate in abortion,
sterilization, or contraception on one side, and much of the medical
and legal establishment on the other, demanding some level of coop-
eration in such procedures.
Since 2007 the obstetric specialty has been a particular focal
point for conscience issues following the issuance of ACOG Ethics
Opinion No. 385. In the Ethics Opinion, ACOG directed physicians
1 COMM. ON ETHICS, AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, ACOG
COMM. Op. No. 385, The Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medicine
(2007) [hereinafter ETHICS OPINION], available at http://www.acog.org/fromhome/
publications/ethics/co385.pdf.
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who object to practices such as abortion on ethical grounds either to
refer patients quickly to other physicians who would perform the pro-
cedure or, if that were not possible, to perform the procedure them-
selves.2 These conclusions coincided with the promulgation of an
annual ABOG Bulletin on obstetric certification noting that certifica-
tion could be revoked for "violation of ABOG or ACOG rules and/or
ethics principles or felony convictions. '3 The Bulletin for 2009 omit-
ted the language about ACOG, but it was reintroduced in the most
recent Bulletin for 2011. 4 It thus became possible that refusal to per-
form or to refer for abortion could be grounds for revocation of a
physician's specialty certification in obstetrics.
Under current ACOG standards and ABOG rules our hypotheti-
cal obstetrician situation is one that could occur in the near future.
How can he respond? Currently, he is able to contest the revocation
of certification through the Office of Civil Rights of the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) .5 However regulations recently
promulgated by HHS rescind the administrative authorization for
such a course if enacted. 6 He could try to pursue legal claims under
various statutes, such as the Church Amendments7 or the Hyde-Wel-
don Amendment," protecting the conscience rights of healthcare pro-
fessionals. Yet these statutes lack a clear channel for redress of
grievances, particularly as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
2 See id. at 1.
3 See William L. Saunders & Michael A. Fragoso, Conscience Protection in Health
and Human Services, 10 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST Soc'Y PRAC. GROUPS, July 2009, at 115,
115 (quoting Am. BD. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, BULLETIN FOR 2008: MAINTE-
NANCE OF CERTIFICATION 10, 5.b (Nov. 2007)); infra Part I.B.
4 See infra Part I.A.
5 45 C.F.R. § 88.6 (2010). On January 11, 2011, the pro-life Alliance Defense
Fund filed such a complaint with Health and Human Services on behalf of a nursing
student seeking admission into Vanderbilt University Medical Center residency pro-
gram, whose application required those interested in the "Women's Health track" to
agree to assist in the termination of pregnancies. See Press Release, Alliance Defense
Fund, Vanderbilt University Illegally Requiring Nursing Residents to Sign Abortion
Pledge (Jan. 11, 2011), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/4511.
The disposition of the Office of Civil Rights toward such a claim was never deter-
mined, as Vanderbilt quickly relented on its own. See Press Release, Alliance Defense
Fund, Vanderbilt University Abandons Illegal Policy That Forced Nursing Residents
to Sign Abortion Pledge (Jan. 12, 2011), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/News/
PRDetail/4512.
6 74 Fed. Reg. 10,207 (proposed Mar. 10, 2009) (partially codified at 45 C.F.R.
pt. 88 (2011)).
7 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2006).
8 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. G, tit. V,
§ 508(d), 121 Stat. 1844, 2209.
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Circuit held in November 2010 that the Church Amendments do not
entail a private remedy.9
This Note suggests that constitutional takings doctrine can pro-
vide another colorable avenue of redress for a decertified obstetrician.
While the question of physicians' conscience rights is typically dis-
cussed in the context of abortion rights and religious freedom, prop-
erty interests are a neglected component to the question. Indeed, an
obstetrician has vested property interest in his medical practice, which
is compromised by efforts to regulate his conduct in a way that contra-
dicts the autonomy to practice in good conscience on which he previ-
ously relied.
In revoking a Certificate based on newly promulgated and con-
troversial ethical determinations, ABOG, acting pursuant to a public
function, deprives a physician of a vested property interest (namely,
the goodwill of his medical practice). This goodwill property interest
is colorable in a takings context in some jurisdictions and ought to be
from a broader normative perspective. Such a deprivation, in light of
the novelty of the cause of revocation, would fail a doctrinal regula-
tory taking analysis due to the reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions of the physician in arranging his practice. That is, he built his
practice under the then sound expectation that he could invest time
and money into it while both exercising conscientious objection to
certain procedures and pursuing the best health interests of his
patients according to his legitimate professional determinations.
Furthermore, in light of recent efforts at healthcare reform, this
deprivation of obstetric property interests would yield perverse results
in terms of both access to healthcare and reducing costs. Access to
many types of medical care would be reduced through the reduction
of the present and future supply of available obstetricians, while costs
would potentially increase as a result of both increased scarcity due to
the reduced supply of physicians and increased transition costs as phy-
sicians move in and out of obstetrics and other specialties.
After providing background on recent controversies regarding
healthcare providers' conscience in Part I, this Note will explain why
an ABOG decertification based on noncompliance with the Ethics
Opinion could meet the criteria needed to constitute a regulatory tak-
ing. Part II examines whether or not ABOG meets the public function
standards of the state action doctrine. Part III looks at the nature of a
medical practice and its goodwill to see if (a) it is property in a consti-
9 See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695, 699 (2d Cir. 2010)
("What we do hold today is that [the Church Amendment] does not confer . .. a
private right of action to enforce its terms.").
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tutionally cognizable sense, and (b) whether it ought to be so. Part IV
applies the current regulatory takings doctrine to the case of Certifi-
cate revocation. Part V addresses two related concerns: (a) the poten-
tial that conscience protection creates an "undue burden" on
reproductive rights, and (b) the possible negative implications on the
supply of obstetricians and its relation to broader policy interests in
healthcare reform.
I. CONSCIENCE PROTECTION
The contours of physicians' conscience rights and correlative pro-
fessional obligations have been contested for decades. Indeed, the
last half century has seen profound changes in both the practice of
medicine 0 and the state of law 1 that necessarily implicate the posi-
tion of the physician vis-d-vis the patient and the procedures she may
be asked to provide.
On one side of this debate has been the view that conscience is a
morally constitutive aspect of human nature and thus to force anyone
to violate his or her conscience is a profound moral wrong. In the
case of physicians, this view requires both the conscientious adher-
ence to the accepted standards of medical practice,' 2 and to "a per-
sonal set of moral beliefs" based "in religious affiliation, personal
preference, or moral reflection."1 3 Such personal moral beliefs
center on how we value human life itself, its purposes, quality,
destiny, and utility. Conflicts of belief in this realm are more
10 See Azgad Gold, Physicians' "Right of Conscience"--Beyond Politics, 38 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 134, 136 (2010) (noting the change in recent decades in how patients view the
practice of medicine, namely that "It]he medical field became more 'subjective' than
'objective,' as reflected by the shift from measuring outcomes of treatments by 'qual-
ity of life' parameters rather than the traditional objective 'morbidity' and 'mortality'
parameters"); see also Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Physician's Conscience, Conscience
Clauses, and Religious Belief: A Catholic Perspective, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 221, 223 (2002)
("For some, the ends and goals of medicine are no longer defined solely by physi-
cians, but by social convention or the demands of patients or their families. On this
view, the physician practices by virtue of a social contract, which grants her profession
the privileges of freedom to practice in return for provision of those services that
society requires or demands. What constitutes the practice of medicine is societally
determined." (footnote omitted)).
11 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) ("This means... that, for the
[first trimester] of pregnancy . . .the attending physician, in consultation with his
patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical
judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached,
the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State.").
12 See Pellegrino, supra note 10, at 230.
13 Id. at 231.
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profound and deeply felt in one's conscience than other issues of
professional behavior with patients. For religious individuals of
many persuasions, these issues bear directly on their personal spiri-
tual destinies and are, therefore, least subject to compromise.14
As a result, "[c]onscientious objection implies the physician's right
not to participate in what she thinks morally wrong, even if the patient
demands it."'u
Mainstream medical ethics expresses these principles through
the basic tenet that physicians "have the right to refuse service to
patients."' 6  Furthermore, under a traditional understanding,
"[h]ospital employees have the right to refuse to participate in per-
forming an abortion, and a hospital cannot dismiss the employee for
insubordination. An employee can abstain from assisting in an abor-
tion procedure as a matter of conscience or religious conviction."
17
On the other side of this debate, there is a view that the principle
of "patient autonomy" should be paramount, and what is conscien-
tious objection to one person is burdensome refusal to another.1 8
Under this view, the demands of the patient win and conscientious
objection is a coercive imposition on the rights of the patient.
In the past decade the debate over conscientious objection by
physicians and other medical personnel has manifested itself in a vari-
14 Id.
15 Id. at 242. Dr. Pellegrino goes on to argue that patients indeed have a correla-
tive right to have a physician "not presume the right to impose her will or conception
of the good on the patient." Id. The tension between these two potentially compet-
ing rights is relieved, in his view, through disclosure. "Individual physicians should
prepare a leaflet outlining what they can, and cannot, in good conscience do.
Patients should know in advance of a crisis that what they desire and believe to be
morally acceptable may not be acceptable to the physicians they may be engaging."
Id. at 242-43 (footnote omitted).
16 BONNIE F. FREMGEN, MEDICAL LAW AND ETHICS 76 (2002).
17 Id. at 201.
18 See Rachel White-Domain, Comment, Making Rules and Unmaking Choice: Federal
Conscience Clauses, the Provider Conscience Regulation, and the War on Reproductive Freedom,
59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1249, 1250 n.11 (2010) (noting that "the favored term among
some supporters of reproductive rights [for conscience clauses] is 'refusal clauses'");
see also Martha S. Swartz, "Conscience Clauses" or "Unconscionable Clauses ": Personal Beliefs
Versus Professional Responsibilities, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 269, 348 (2006)
("The widely accepted ethical principle that patients are autonomous individuals with
the right to make the final decisions concerning their medical care, along with the
corresponding principle that appears in all medical professionals' codes of ethics that
the 'patient's interest comes first' leads to the following general rule: patient care
decisions should be based on patient autonomy, as mediated by the clinician's conclu-
sion that the requested therapy (1) is not medically contraindicated (since it is both
medically effective and not considered unethical within the profession's generally
accepted concept of ethical practice) and (2) is not illegal." (emphasis added)).
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ety of situations. These situations include (but are not limited to)
pharmacists refusing to dispense drugs,19 nurses refusing to assist in
abortions,20 anesthesiologists refusing to participate in executions, 21
Catholic hospitals refusing to provide emergency contraception 22 or
establishing guidelines against performing abortions,23 Catholic orga-
nizations refusing to fund contraceptive coverage in healthcare
plans,24 and obstetricians refusing to perform abortions.25
There are many aspects to this debate, the particulars of which go
beyond the scope of this Note. The debate, however, is ongoing and
is one in which competing moral and philosophical claims continue
to yield distinct and competing conclusions. 26 It is in this theoretical
19 See, e.g., Menges v. Blagojevich, 451 F. Supp. 2d 992, 995 (C.D. Ill. 2006) (look-
ing at the legal contours of a pharmacist firing due to an Illinois law requiring the
provision of emergency contraception over the counter); Denise Hopkins & Marsha
Boss, Pharmacists'Right to Refuse to Dispense Prescriptions Based on Moral Grounds: A Sum-
mary of State Laws and Regulations, 41 Hosp. PHARMACY 1176, 1177 (2006) (studying
which state conscience protections apply to pharmacists); Catherine Grealis, Note,
Religion in the Pharmacy: A Balanced Approach to Pharmacists' Right to Refuse to Provide
Plan B, 97 GEO. LJ. 1715, 1720-23 (2009) (providing a history of the conflict over
pharmacists' refusal to provide the emergency contraceptive drug, Plan B); Sarah
Sturmon Dale, Can a Pharmacist Refuse to Dispense Birth Control? TIME, June 7, 2004, at
22 (providing some of the political background to arguments over pharmacists' con-
science rights).
20 See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695, 696 (2d Cir. 2010);
Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 223 F.3d 220, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2000).
21 See Press Release, Physicians for Human Rights, PHR Supports Refusal of Cali-
fornia Anesthesiologists to Participate in Execution (Feb. 23, 2006), available at http:/
/physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/statement-2006-02-23.html.
22 See Catholic Charities, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 75 (Cal. 2004).
23 See Brigette Amiri, Religious Doctrine Can't Trump Patients' Lives and Health,
ACLU BLOG RTS. (July 1, 2010, 2:02 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/religion-belief-
reproductive-freedom/religious-doctrine-cant-trump-patients-lives-and-health.
24 See Patrick J. Reilly, Look Who's Discriminating Now, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2009, at
Wl.
25 See, e.g.,Jenny Hope, Now NHS Doctors Refuse to Carry Out Late Abortions on Moral
Grounds, MAIL ONLINE (May 17, 2008), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
566938/Now-NHS-doctors-refuse-carry-late-abortions-moral-grounds.html (explaining
how in the United Kingdom "[National Health Service] doctors are refusing to carry
out late abortions, forcing hospitals to contract them out to private clinics and
charities").
26 See, e.g., President's Council on Bioethics, Conscience in the Practice of Health
Care Professions, Transcripts (Sept. 11, 2008), (testimony of Robert P. George),
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/transcripts/septO8/session3.html ("The
[Ethics Opinion], in other words, in its driving assumptions, reasoning, and conclu-
sions is not morally neutral. Its analysis and recommendations for action do not pro-
ceed from a basis of moral neutrality. It represents a partisan position among the
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context that one must evaluate the efforts by ACOG, Congress, and
HHS to establish workable policies on the issue.
A. Abortion Referral and the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists
Prior to November 2007, the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists had not taken a definitive stance on the issue of
conscientious objection. The organization had established ethical
guidelines relating to the permissibility of abortion, but these
included an acknowledgement of "physician autonomy" in the right of
obstetricians not to perform abortions.
27
ACOG's relative neutrality regarding physician refusal to perform
an abortion ended with the promulgation of its Ethics Committee
Opinion #385 entitled "The Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Repro-
ductive Medicine." 28 The Ethics Opinion lays out a conception of
conscience described as "the private, constant, ethically attuned part
of the human character."29 Conscience expresses itself in phrases like
"[i]f I were to do 'x,' I could not live with myself/I would hate myself/
I wouldn't be able to sleep at night."30 While conscience is a question
family of possible positions debated or adopted by people of reason and goodwill in
the medical profession and beyond.").
27 For a history of ACOG's early efforts to address the abortion issue in the era of
liberalized abortion starting in 1970, see Nancy Aries, The American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists and the Evolution of Abortion Policy, 1951-1973: The Politics of Sci-
ence, 93 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 1810, 1810 (2003). Aries explains how ACOG's Executive
Board maintained a "conservative" approach to abortion provisions (essentially retain-
ing for physicians the decision whether or not an abortion should be performed)
even as New York began to liberalize its abortion laws in 1970. See id. at 1816. Those
who favored liberal abortion access in the ACOG Committee on Professional Stan-
dards subsequently revised the Standards for Obstetric-Cynecologic Hospital Services in a
way that "diverged from the college's policy," stating, " [i] t is recognized that abortion
may be performed at a patient's request, or upon a physician's recommendation." Id.
(quoting College Policy on Abortion and Sterilization, ACOG NEWSLETTER 2 (Sept. 1970)).
To solve this inconsistency the Executive Board polled the membership of ACOG
finding that eighty-two percent supported the Committee standards, and "[w]ith the
poll, those board members who supported a woman's right to abortion found a
method to liberalize the college's policy without debate." Id. The end result of the
changes was that ACOG would support a liberalized legal abortion regime, while
retaining physician "authority over whether or not to perform an abortion, how it was
to be done, and what constituted a reimbursable medical indication." Id. at 1818.
28 See ETHICS OPINION, supra note 1.
29 See id. at 2.
30 Id. (quotation marks omitted). But see President's Council on Bioethics, supra
note 26 (testimony by Alfonso Gomez-Lobo) ("Now, I find [the Ethics Opinion's defi-
nition of conscience] incredible. I mean, it's such a misunderstanding of what's
1694 [VOL. 86:4
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of "moral integrity,"3' the Ethics Opinion ultimately concludes "there
are clearly limits to the degree to which appeals to conscience may
justifiably guide decision making."32 This gives precedence, ulti-
mately, to the principle of "patient autonomy. '33 The Ethics Opinion
then provides the following recommendations, inter alia, as to the
ethical practice of obstetrics:
3. Where conscience implores physicians to deviate from standard
practices, including abortion, sterilization, and provision of contra-
ceptives, they must provide potential patients with accurate and
prior notice of their personal moral commitments. In the process
of providing prior notice, physicians should not use their profes-
sional authority to argue or advocate these positions.
4. Physicians and other health care professionals have the duty to
refer patients in a timely manner to other providers if they do not
feel that they can in conscience provide the standard reproductive
services that their patients request.
5. In an emergency in which referral is not possible or might nega-
tively affect a patient's physical or mental health, providers have an
obligation to provide medically indicated and requested care
regardless of the provider's personal moral objections. 34
In short, obstetric physicians who have a conscientious objection to
performing an abortion or sterilization, or providing contraception
must (1) provide notice to patients of this fact, (2) refer patients to
other providers for such procedures if they are unwilling to provide
them, and (3) perform the procedures themselves regardless of con-
scientious objection if referral is not feasible.
going on. It may be a consequence of that conscience that I cannot sleep at night,
but conscience is a particular practical judgment as to whether what I'm going to do is
morally right or morally wrong, which means whether I'm going to harm a human
good or benefit a human good.").
31 See ETHICS OPINION, supra note 1, at 2.
32 Id. at 2-3.
33 See id. at 3.
34 Id. at 5. The Ethics Opinion also notes:
In resource-poor areas, access to safe and legal reproductive services should
be maintained. Conscientious refusals that undermine access should raise
significant caution. Providers with moral or religious objections should
either practice in proximity to individuals who do not share their views or
ensure that referral processes are in place so that patients have access to the
service that the physician does not wish to provide. Rights to withdraw from
caring for an individual should not be a pretext for interfering with patients'
rights to health care services.
2011] 1695
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The Ethics Opinion has been widely criticized by anti-abortion
scholars and practitioners.3 5 Perhaps strongest among these criticisms
is the view that the Ethics Opinion would have the effect of silencing
dissent within the field of obstetrics and boxing out practitioners of a
particular moral worldview.
If [the ACOG Ethics Committee's] advice were followed . .. [the
obstetric] fields of medical practice would be cleansed of pro-life
physicians whose convictions required them to refrain from per-
forming or referring for abortions. The entire field would be com-
posed of people who could be relied on either to agree with or at a
minimum go along with their convictions, those of the report's
authors, on this most profound of moral questions upon which rea-
sonable people of goodwill disagree, yet must somehow find a way
to live together in peace and discuss their differences with civility
and mutual respect.
36
While not explicitly stated in the Ethics Opinion, the policies
endorsed by it-in limiting conscientious objection and mandating
complicity in abortion and related procedures-would make obstet-
rics an unappealing specialty for those who have moral objections to
abortion.3 7 This would force them out of the field, or preclude their
entering into it.
35 See, e.g., AM. ASS'N OF PRO-LIFE OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, AAPLOG
RESPONSE TO THE ACOG ETHICS COMMITTEE OPINION #385, TITLED "THE LIMITS OF
CONSCIENTIOUS REFUSAL IN REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE" (Feb. 6, 2008), available at http:/
/aaplog.octoberblue.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/aaplog-to-EthicsComm-
Response-feb-6-pdf.pdf ("We find it unethical and unacceptable that a small commit-
tee of ACOG members would pretend to provide the moral compass for 49,000 other
members on one of the most ethically controversial issues in our society and within
our medical specialty-and that without ever consulting the full membership.").
36 See President's Council on Bioethics, supra note, 26 (testimony by Robert P.
George).
37 As Dr. Pellegrino has noted:
For Catholics, Orthodox Jews, and [Muslims], the teachings of the Gos-
pel, Torah, or Koran take precedence in their lives and indeed inspire their
healing vocations. For these major religions, healing the sick is ultimately a
religious act and it comes ultimately from God. To practice medicine that
contravenes religious teaching would be to subvert conscience to secular
society and its "values," to act hypocritically, and to violate moral integrity
intolerably.
For Catholics this would also apply to the secular demand that those
who must refrain from certain practice must refer physicians who will pro-
vide the disputed treatment or procedure would also be intolerable. To
cooperate in an act which is regarded as inherently morally wrong, such as
arranging for an abortion or assisted suicide, is to be a moral accomplice.
Respectfully, courteously, but definitively the religious physician must
inform the patient of her objection while promising to care for the patient
SERIOUSLY TAKING CONSCIENCE?1
This criticism is particularly sound as the exclusion of practition-
ers with pro-life moral or religious convictions is an outcome that has
been endorsed by prominent medical ethicists in the context of prov-
iders' conscience debates. As Professor Julie Cantor argued in the
New England Journal of Medicine, "[a]s the gate-keepers to medicine,
physicians and other health care providers have an obligation to
choose specialties that are not moral minefields for them. Qualms
about abortion, sterilization, and birth control? Do not practice
women's health."38 Likewise, Oxford ethicist Julian Savulescu had
opined in the British Journal of Medicine, "[i]f people are not prepared
to offer legally permitted, efficient, and beneficial care to a patient
because it conflicts with their values, they should not be doctors."3 9
These are well-credentialed individuals, affiliated with prestigious
institutions, arguing in top-flight journals in favor of the purposeful
exclusion of dissenting voices within the medical profession.
B. Specialty Certification in Obstetrics
The policies endorsed by the Ethics Opinion, in a sense, are
merely an opinion by a committee of ethicists at ACOG. However, the
policies can be enforced in the hands of ABOG because of its specialty
certification power. This certification power incorporates the ethical
norms of ACOG.
General medical licenses are regulated by the individual states. 40
The states decide who is and who is not entitled to practice medicine
in general. As long as there has been professional medicine in
America, however, there have also been attendant specialties. 41 As the
twentieth century progressed and "[a]s the number of physicians who
limited their practice increased, many of them organized their own
until transfer or referral can be arranged by the patient, family, or social
services.
Pellegrino, supra note 10, at 239-40 (footnotes omitted).
38 Julie D. Cantor, Conscientious Objection Gone Awry-Restoring Selfless Professional
ism in Medicine, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1484, 1485 (2009).
39 Julian Savulescu, Conscientious Objection in Medicine, 332 BRIT. MED. J. 294, 294
(2006).
40 See, e.g., Medical Licensing Board of Indiana, IN.Gov, http://www.in.gov/pla/
medical.htm (last visited May 28, 2011) (providing information on obtaining a medi-
cal license in Indiana).
41 See GLENN GREENWOOD & ROBERT F. FREDERICKSON, SPECIALIZATION IN THE MED-
ICAL AND LEGAL PROFESSIONS 6-7 (1964) ("By the time the American medical profes-
sion began to develop, specialization had become accepted as proper in Europe.").
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associations. These associations were independent of the American
Medical Association and of each other."42
In addition to the development of specialty associations there was a
proliferation of specialty boards.4 3 These boards "are not associations
of specialists, but are boards consisting of selected specialists who
examine and certify applicants who wish to be recognized as special-
ists." 44 A board's function is to "(1) determine whether candidates
have received adequate preparation, (2) provide a comprehensive test
of ability and fitness of such candidates and (3) certify to the compe-
tence of those physicians who have satisfied their requirements.
45
Certification by a specialty board confers with it a public recognition
of training 46 and competence 47 that is crucial for physicians in their
professional dealings with hospitals, insurers, and other employers.
48
In obstetrics, a specialist falls into one of six categories: ABOG
Registered-Residency Graduate, Active Candidate, Diplomate,
Expired Certificate, Retired Diplomate, and Revoked Certificate. 49 In
order to have a Certificate revoked, there must be cause, which "may
be due to, but is not limited to, licensure revocation or disciplinary
restriction by any State Board of Medical Examiners, violation of ABOG
orACOG rules and/or ethical principles, or felony convictions." 50 What is
meant by "ABOG or ACOG rules and/or ethics principles" is not clari-
fied further in the Bulletin. At the same time, the ACOG Ethics Com-
mittee has issued scores of opinions on all manner of ethical questions
42 Id. at 15.
43 Id. at 16.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 21. Currently the American Board of Medical Specialties (the national
umbrella organization of medical boards) recognizes twenty four specialty boards. See
What Board Certification Means, AM. BOARD MED. SPECIALTIES, http://www.abms.org/
About BoardCertification/means.aspx (last visited May 28, 2011).
46 See How a Physician Becomes Board Certified, AM. BOARD MED. SPECIALTIES, http://
www.abms.org/Who-We Help/Consumers/process.aspx (last visited May 28, 2011).
47 See Board Certification & Your Career, AM. BOARD MED. SPECIALTIES, http://www.
abms.org/Who WeHelp/Physicians/career.aspx (last visited May 28, 2011) ("Certifi-
cation by an ABMS Member Board has long been considered the gold standard in
medical specialty certification. By pursuing board certification, you elevate yourself
into the ranks of physicians committed to maintaining the highest possible standards
for healthcare.").
48 See id. ("Verifying board certification is not simply the province of hospitals.
Insurers, healthcare organizations and even large employers not traditionally associ-
ated with healthcare are now interested in board certification as a marker of quality
healthcare delivery.").
49 AM. BD. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, 2011 BULLETIN FOR BASIC CERTIFICA-
TION IN OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 6-8 (2010).
50 Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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facing obstetrics. 51 Given the vagueness of ABOG's terms and the vol-
ume of ACOG Ethics Committee opinions, it is reasonable to infer
that ACOG Committee opinions can affect ABOG ethics
determinations.
Thus far ABOG has not revoked any Certificates for violation of
the "ethical principles" espoused in the Ethics Opinion. Indeed,
ABOG insists that such an outcome is not consistent with their prac-
tices. 52 This argument, however, is unsatisfactory in many ways, not
least of which is ABOG's failure to clarify any of the vagueness in the
Bulletin as to which ethical criteria are encompassed by the refer-
enced ABOG and ACOG rules.5 3 Also telling is the fact that ABOG
switched the enumerated causes for decertification between 2008 and
2009, removing the reference to ACOG in order to make it clear that
the Ethics Opinion would not affect board certification while HHS
was considering federal regulations on healthcare providers' con-
science. 54 Yet by 2011 ABOG reinserted the ACOG reference in their
Maintenance of Certification Bulletin, reestablishing the saliency of
earlier concerns about decertification on conscience grounds.
55
51 See Committee on Ethics Committee Opinions, ACOG: Am. C. OBSTETRICIANS &
GYNECOLOGISTS, http://www.acog.org/from-home/publications/ethics (last visited
May 28, 2011).
52 See Letter from Norman F. Gant, Exec. Dir., ABOG, to Michael 0. Leavitt,
Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., (Mar. 19, 2008), available at http://www.
aaplog.octoberblue.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/ABOGDrGant-to-Leavitt-
Response3.19.08.pdf.
53 See generally Michael Leavitt, Physician Conscience, LEAvITr PARTNERS (Aug. 7,
2008), http://leavittpartners.com/blog/physician-conscience ("Frankly, I found
[ABOG's] response to be dodgy and unsatisfying. I sent another letter, more of the
same."); see also Letter from the AAPLOG Board of Trustees to Norman F. Gant, Exec.
Dir., ABOG (Apr. 7, 2008), available at http://aaplog.octoberblue.com/wp-content/
uploads/2010/02/AAPLOG-to-ABOG-Gant-20080407.pdf (requesting clarification on
certain ambiguous points made by Dr. Gant). But see Letter from Kenneth L. Noller,
President, ACOG, to Fellows of the Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists (Mar.
26, 2008), available at http://www.aaplog.octoberblue.com/wp-content/uploads/
2010/02/Noller-to-Fellows-3-27-08.pdf ("We want to be clear the Opinion does not
compel any Fellow to perform any procedure which he or she finds to be in conflict
with his or her conscience and affirms the importance of conscience in shaping ethi-
cal professional conduct.").
54 See Letter from AAPLOG to the Off. of Pub. Health & Sci., U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., Re: Proposed Rescission of Provider Conscience Rule 74 Fed.
Reg. 10,207 (Mar. 10, 2009), at 4 (Apr. 9, 2009), available at http://downloads.frc.
org/EF/EF09D50.pdf.
55 See AM. BD. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, supra note 49, at 7.
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C. Recent Legal Protections of Physicians' Conscience
The Ethics Opinion by ACOG and the ABOG certification stan-
dards ignited a political controversy in the context of legal protections
for physicians' conscience rights. It is worth tracing the historical and
more recent statutory and regulatory conscience protections for
healthcare providers.
1. Statutory Provisions
The first federal legislative protections56 of physicians' conscience
were enacted in the wake of Roe v. Wade57 and are known as the
Church Amendments. 58 The four Church Amendments (dating from
1973, 1974, and 1979) prohibit recipients of federal funds under the
Public Health Services Act, Community Mental Health Centers Act,
and Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction
Act from performing or assisting in "any sterilization procedure or
abortion, if his performance would be contrary to his religious beliefs
or moral convictions." 59 The Church Amendments also ban discrimi-
nation against medical professionals who have "performed... a lawful
sterilization procedure or abortion" or "refused to perform... such a
procedure or abortion."60
Later, Congress passed Public Health Services Act § 245, known
as the Coats Amendment. 61 The Coats Amendment was written in
response to developments in medical education, whereby the Accredi-
tation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) deter-
mined that obstetrics and gynecology residency programs ought to
provide abortion training. It provides that the federal government
and any state or local government receiving federal funding cannot
discriminate against a broadly defined "health care entity" because it
(1) refuses to receive, provide or require abortion training; (2) refuses
to provide abortions; (3) refuses to provide referrals for abortions or
abortion training; or (4) attended a training program that did or does
not require attendees to perform abortions or require, provide, or
refer for training in the performance of abortions or make arrange-
ments for such training. 62
56 For an inexhaustive list (and critical analysis) of state legislative protections of
medical conscience rights, see Swartz, supra note 18, at 270-73.
57 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
58 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2006).
59 Id. § 300a-7(b).
60 Id. § 300a-7(c).
61 Id. § 238n.
62 Id.
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The most recent legislative protection of physicians' conscience
was the Hyde-Weldon Amendment of 2005, written by now-retired
Florida congressman Dr. David Weldon as a rider on the Labor/HHS
appropriation. 63 It reads:
None of the funds made available in this Act may be made available
to a Federal agency or program, or to a state or local government, if
such agency, program, or government subjects any institutional or
individual health care entity to discrimination on the basis that the
health care entity does not provide, pay for, provide coverage of, or
refer for abortions.64
The Amendment defines "health care entity" as "an individual physi-
cian or other health care professional, a hospital, a provider-spon-
sored organization, a health maintenance organization, a health
insurance plan, or any other kind of health care facility, organization,
or plan."65
Taken together, the three sets of amendments provide fairly
broad conscience protections for physicians in any context involving
federal funds. Likewise, forty-six states (and the District of Columbia)
have enacted legislative protections of physicians refusing to partici-
pate in abortion. 66
Nevertheless, the applicability of these federal amendments and
state laws is unclear given the recently passed healthcare reform law,
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).67 As the
PPACA contains its own revenue stream (not relying on general omni-
bus Congressional appropriations), the Hyde-Weldon and Church
Amendments would not apply to it. Further, the Act was passed with-
out a comprehensive conscience rider-although Senator Tom
Coburn (an obstetrician) of Oklahoma proposed one.68 The result is
that the Act contains the potential to contravene established physi-
cians' conscience protections in the area of reproductive health in its
63 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. G, tit. V,
§ 508(d), 121 Stat. 1844, 2209.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Leonard J. Long, Can Health Care Conscientious Objectors Thread the Needle? 13
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 51, 66 (2009) (quoting HOLLY FERNANDEZ LYNCH, CONFLICTS
OF CONSCIENCE IN HEALTH CARE 20 (2008)); see also Mark L. Rienzi, The Constitu-
tional Right to Refuse: Roe, Casey, and the Fourteenth Amendment Rights of Health-
care Providers 40-41 & n.140 (Jan. 27, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1749788 (cataloguing a series of representative state
statutes).
67 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
68 S. Amend. 828 to S. Con. Res. 13, 111th Cong. (2009).
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regulatory interpretation. 69 The PPACA is also silent as to any possi-
ble preemption of existing state conscience laws by new federal man-
dates or funding regulations.
2. Conscience Protection in Health and Human Services
Regulations
While the Church Amendments have been in force since the
1970s, there were no regulations seeking to implement those statutory
provisions or the subsequent conscience protections until January
2009.70 These new conscience regulations were promulgated by the
Department of Health and Human Services, at the direction of Presi-
dent George W. Bush's HHS Secretary, Michael 0. Leavitt in the final
days of the Bush administration.
The background of these regulations was the ACOG Ethics Opin-
ion mandating performance of or referral for abortion and concern
that ABOG would use these new ethical standards to revoke the certifi-
cation of pro-life doctors. Upon learning about the Ethics Opinion,
Secretary Leavitt wrote to the Executive Director of ABOG, Norman F.
Gant, expressing his concerns that the Ethics Opinion and the ABOG
Bulletin, when taken together, would result in decertifications on con-
69 See Helen Alvar6, How the New Health Care Law Endangers Conscience, PUB. Dis-
COURSE (June 29, 2010), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2010/06/1402
("[W]hile §1303(b)(1) provides that abortion cannot be considered an 'essential
health benefit' under the new law, it does nothing to exclude abortion from being
included within other categories of mandated services such as 'ambulatory patient
services,' 'prescription drugs,' or 'preventive services.' All of these categories the Sec-
retary of HHS is authorized to populate under §1302(b). Nor does §1301(b) (1) pro-
vide that other procedures or services inimical to religious or moral convictions (e.g.
sterilization, contraception, genetic testing, new reproductive technologies) may not
be characterized by the Secretary as mandatory benefits under any one of these cate-
gories, including 'essential health benefits.'").
70 See 45 C.F.R. § 88 (2008). See generally Andre Draxton &Jessica Andrew, Note,
From Pre-School Aides to Presidents: Themes and Scenes of the Abortion Debate, 11 J.L. & FAM.
STUD. 457, 460 (placing the Bush-era conscience regulations in the broader context of
executive efforts to combat judicial efforts to maintain the legality of abortion); Saun-
ders & Fragoso, supra note 3, at 116-17 (describing the language of the Bush-era
conscience regulations as well as some objections to them); 0. Carter Snead, Public
Bioethics and the Bush Presidency, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 867, 899 (2009) ("The
highest profile action of the Bush Administration in [the physicians' conscience] con-
text was the issuance by HHS of a final rule that clarified and strengthened the pro-
tection of existing federal laws on healthcare provider conscience."); Kim Worobec &
Jennifer Gray, HHS' New Provider Conscience Regulations, 21 HEALTH L., Apr. 2009, at
35, 35 (explaining the particular provisions of the Bush-era conscience regulations).
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science grounds.7' There was disagreement between ABOG and Leav-
itt as to whether or not Leavitt's concerns were valid, 72 and Secretary
Leavitt's interactions with Dr. Gant were not particularly fruitful. 73
Accordingly Leavitt instructed HHS to begin considering a rule, a
draft of which was leaked to the New York Times.7 4 Thereafter the
71 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., HHS Secretary Calls
on Certification Group to Protect Conscience Rights (Mar. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2008pres/03/20080314a.html ("I am concerned
that the actions taken by ACOG and ABOG could result in the denial or revocation of
Board certification of a physician who-but for his or her refusal, for example, to
refer a patient for an abortion-would be certified.").
72 SeeJulie Rovner, Ob/Gyn Group: New Ethics Standards Misinterpreted, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO (Mar. 20, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=
88650797 (quoting Norman F. Gant, Executive Director of ABOG, claiming that Sec-
retary Leavitt "took two and two and came up with five"); see also Letter from Norman
F. Gant, supra note 52 (explaining to Leavitt what he allegedly got wrong).
73 See Leavitt, supra note 53. In a subsequent post, Leavitt clarified precisely what
he viewed as the problematic "ideological basis of opposition to physician con-
science," namely that "if a person goes to medical school they lose their right of con-
science. Freedom of expression and action is surrendered with the issuance of a
medical degree." Michael Leavitt, Physician Conscience Blog II, LEAVIrr PARTNERS (Aug.
11, 2008), http://leavittpartners.com/blog/physician-conscience-blog-ii. In his view
accomplishing this goal via professional certification was particularly abhorrent:
Obviously, some disagree with the federal law [protecting conscience]
and would have it otherwise, so they have begun using the accreditation stan-
dards of physician professional organizations to define the exercise of con-
science unprofessional and thereby make doctors choose between their
capacity to practice in good standing and their right of conscience. In my
view, that is simply unfair and a clear effort to subvert the law in favor of
their ideology.
Id.
74 See Robert Pear, Abortion Proposal Sets Condition on Aid, N.Y. TIMESJuly 15, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/washington/15rule.html. But see Leavitt,
supra note 53 (responding to the leak, stating: "The Department is still contemplating
if it will issue a regulation or not. If it does, it will be directly focused on the protec-
tion of practitioner conscience."). Secretary Leavitt's actions prior and subsequent to
the leaking of the draft regulations caused a conflagration in the concerned precincts
of politics and the pundit class, which is beyond the scope of this Note. For some
commentary on that controversy at the time, see, for example, Rachel Walden, ABOG
Calls Out Secretary Leavitt Misrepresenting Certification Issue in Support of Proposed Regula-
tion, OUR BODIES, OURSELVES (Aug. 25, 2008, 9:01 AM), http://www.ourbodiesour
blog.org/blog/2008/08/abog-calls-out-secretary-leavitt-for-misrepresenting-certifica-
tion-issue-in-support-of-proposed-regulation, presenting a representative pro-choice
view on the controversy, and Wendy Wright, HHS Secretary Seeks Your Comments on
Whether to Protect Pro-Life Doctors, CONCERNED WOMEN FOR AMERICA (Aug. 12, 2008),
http://www.cwalac.org/article-737.shtml, offering a pro-life defense of Secretary
Leavitt's actions.
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agency issued notice of a proposed rule,75 and ultimately promulgated
a rule protecting physicians' conscience rights, including protections
against potential Certificate revocation.76
These regulatory protections against an ABOG Certificate revoca-
tion on conscientious objection grounds are still in force. However,
in 2009 HHS gave notice in the Federal Register that President
Obama intended to rescind them in their entirety. 77 The new rules
were published on February 23, 2011.78 The new rule eliminated sec-
tions 88.2 through 88.5 (definitions, applicability, requirements and
prohibitions, and certification, respectively) retaining the statement
of purpose of the rule (section 88.1) and the designation of HHS's
Office of Civil Rights as the department through which complaints are
channeled (formerly section 88.6, now section 88.2).
Thus, currently, there are a number of statutory and regulatory
protections for physicians' conscience rights that might ostensibly pro-
tect obstetric specialists from having their Certificates revoked. How-
ever, the statutory protections are somewhat indeterminate in scope,79
and the regulatory protections have recently been in flux. Even if cur-
rently effective, albeit in a weakened form, the regulations are still
easily rescindable or further alterable.
If these statutory and regulatory protections are rescinded or oth-
erwise ineffective, physicians might be able to raise a number of con-
stitutional objections (under either the U.S. Constitution or state
constitutions) to protect their freedom of conscience. Physicians also
might have a constitutionally cognizable claim to conscience rights
(under Free Exercise of Religion) that would presumably preclude
Certificate revocation. 0 Alternatively, they might have a due process
75 73 Fed. Reg. 50,274 (proposed Aug. 26, 2008) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
88).
76 See 45 C.F.R. § 88.4(a) (3) (2009) ("For the purposes of granting a legal status
to a health care entity (including a license or certificate), or providing such entity
with financial assistance, services or benefits, fail to deem accredited any postgraduate
physician training program that would be accredited but for the accrediting agency's
reliance upon an accreditation standard or standards that require an entity to per-
form an induced abortion or require, provide, or refer for training in the perform-
ance of induced abortions, or make arrangements for such training, regardless of
whether such standard provides exceptions or exemptions .
77 74 Fed. Reg. 10,207 (proposed Mar. 10, 2009).
78 45 C.F.R. § 88 (2011).
79 See, e.g., Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695, 697-98 (2d Cir.
2010) (calling into question the available private legal channels for healthcare provid-
ers whose consciences are violated).
80 See, e.g., Nora O'Callaghan, Lessons from Pharaoh and the Hebrew Midwives: Consci-
entious Objection to State Mandates as Free Exercise Right, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 561, 565
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claim against Certificate revocation.8 l I contend that physicians also
might have a legitimate claim against the revocation of their Certifi-
cate insofar as it constitutes a taking of their vested property interests
in their medical practices.
II. MEDICAL BOARD AS A STATE ACTOR
In order for an obstetrician to have a cognizable takings claim
under the Fifth Amendment (or the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause if the taking involves a state actor), the alleged taking
must satisfy the state action doctrine. That is, in order for there to be
a takings claim, the property in question must "be taken in a way in
which the state's involvement is judged significant."8 2 This require-
ment is in keeping with longstanding constitutional doctrine, which
states: "[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself
requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citi-
zens against invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a
limitation on the State's power to act .... -"83 At first glance, it seems
that a decertification by ABOG would not be a state action. After all,
ABOG is "an independent non-profit organization" and not a govern-
ment body or agency.8 4 Yet private actors can be subject to constitu-
tional scrutiny if they are serving a "public function. '8 5
There are many modes of evaluating the applicability of this pub-
lic function exception, and ABOG would most likely come under
entanglement doctrine. Under entanglement (or 'Joint participa-
(2006) ("I argue that conscientious objection claims by religious believers are very close
to the core of religious liberty, are in line with the history and tradition of American
understandings of the proper limits of free exercise rights, generally present less dan-
ger to the community, and should receive a different kind of constitutional analysis
compared to claims of those seeking civil disobedience religious liberty rights.").
81 See T.W. Cousens, Annotation, Suspension or Expulsion from Professional Associa-
tion and the Remedies Therefor, 20 A.L.R.2d 531 (1952) (explaining traditional causes of
action against professional associations on internal procedural grounds); see also
Rienzi, supra note 66, at 46-69 (offering an argument for conscientious refusal by
physicians under substantive due process jurisprudence).
82 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 146 (1977); see
also id. (" [T] he takings clause ... is understood to constrain only state action and not
analogous conduct attempted by private parties.").
83 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
84 About Us, AM. BOARD OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, http://www.abog.org/about.
asp (last visited May 28, 2011).
85 See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) ("Thus, the owners of
privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads may not operate them as freely
as a farmer does his farm. Since these facilities are built and operated primarily to
benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a public function, it is sub-
ject to state regulation.").
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tion") a private actor can be subject to the constitutional restrictions
applicable to state action if the state "insinuated itself into a position
of interdependence" with a private actor in such a way that the state
"must be recognized as ajoint participant in the challenged activity. '86
At a conceptual level an action by ABOG would seem to involve
joint participation with the states and federal government, especially
as the action relates to the consequences of decertification. For exam-
ple, one of the primary consequences of decertification is the revoca-
tion of hospital admitting privileges because hospitals often predicate
those privileges on certification. 87 A number of large and important
hospitals are public institutions.8 8 Likewise, for public and private
hospitals alike, the government is an increasingly active financier of
maternity services, with Medicaid (the principal federal medical safety
net, administered by the states) paying for more than forty percent of
births. 89 The vast majority of non-Medicaid maternity coverage is pro-
vided by private third-party payers, such as insurance and HMOs,
which the federal government already regulates heavily-a situation
that will only increase due to the recent Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act,90 especially as it relates to maternity coverage. 91 In the
event that a decertification adversely affects either public or private
third party reimbursement, it thus affects the healthcare provider in a
way that requires comingled state action.
This analysis encounters problems, however, in that it involves
reverse entanglement. Under a classic entanglement scenario, such as
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, a private actor is acting under
color of state authority (e.g. a private restaurant is discriminating
86 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (noting this in
the context of a Delaware restaurant that refused to serve African Americans, while
occupying space in a building owned by the Wilmington Parking Authority).
87 See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
88 See, e.g., About HHC, N.Y. CITY HEALTH & Hosps. CORP., http://www.nyc.gov/
html/hhc/html/about/about.shtml (last visited May 28, 2011) (noting that the New
York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, run by the City of New York, serves 1.3
million New Yorkers each year).
89 UsHA RANJI ET AL., STATE MEDICAID COVERAGE OF PERINATAL SERVICES 1 (2009)
("Today, Medicaid pays for more than four in ten births nationwide, and in several
states, covers more than half of total births.").
90 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
91 See Adam Sonfield, The Potential of Health Care Reform to Improve Pregnancy-
Related Services and Outcomes, 13 GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV. 13, 15 (2010) ("Most notably,
maternal and newborn care is one of only 10 types of health care services explicitly
required by law to be included in what will become widely known as the 'essential
health benefits package.' That package of services.., will be covered for all enrollees
in all plans sold in the new [insurance] exchanges, as well as in any new individual
and small group policies sold outside of the exchanges.").
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while it occupies property in a government-owned parking garage).
When the relationship is reversed-and the actions of a government
actor (e.g. a public hospital or the state Medicaid authority) implicate
the actions of a private entity with whose requirements they are com-
plying (e.g. ABOG)-current doctrine does not maintain that the pri-
vate actor becomes entangled in such a way as to make its policy
constitutionally justiciable. 92
Furthermore, in the rare cases that these state action questions
have been heard as they relate to healthcare providers-involving dis-
putes over hospital accreditation-the courts have been reluctant to
consider the accrediting authority a state actor.9 3 Thus, while the con-
stitutional status of a medical board like ABOG has not been adjudi-
cated, under current doctrine it is unlikely that ABOG, if it were to
92 In dealing with a suit against the NCAA by a basketball coach, the Supreme
Court framed the issue in this way:
The mirror image presented in this case requires us to step through an ana-
lytical looking glass to resolve the case. Clearly [University of Nevada, Las
Vegas's] conduct was influenced by the rules and recommendations of the
NCAA, the private party. But it was UNLV, the state entity, that actually sus-
pended [Coach Jerry] Tarkanian. Thus the question is ... whether UNLV's
actions in compliance with the NCAA rules and recommendations turned
the NCAA's conduct into state action.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193 (1988). Justice Stevens,
writing for the Court, held that the NCAA's conduct in sanctioning Tarkanian was not
state action even though it resulted in actions that affected him adversely by UNLV, a
state actor. See id. at 199.
93 See McKeesport Hosp. v. Accreditation Council for Graduate Med. Educ., 24
F.3d 519, 524 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that the Accreditation Council for Graduate
Medical Education was not a state actor when it was sued by a hospital for disaccredit-
ing the hospital's residency even though the Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine
had authorized the Council to serve as the state's "accrediting body"). But c.f St.
Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319, 326 (D. Md. 1990) (noting general paucity
of compelling authority on the question of medical accreditation councils constitut-
ing state actors). It is worth noting that St. Agnes was the second decision by the
Maryland District Court on the topic, having previously found that
[ACGME] belittles the connection between the ACGME, the state, and the
issues in this action. The state, through its statutes and regulations, has
given to the ACGME the authority to determine which residency programs
shall be accredited, and thus to determine, in part, how a person must be
trained in order to qualify for a physician's license in the state of Maryland.
St. Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 668 F. Supp 478, 480 (D. Md. 1987). Following Tarkanian,
however, the District Court backtracked on its definitive determination of entangle-
ment. Regardless, the issue in St. Agnes-the removal of residency accreditation from
a Catholic hospital for refusal to teach abortions-was probably mooted by the Coats
Amendment. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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decertify a practitioner, would be entangled with state action in the
provision of medicine.
Nevertheless, a departure from the prevailing reverse entangle-
ment doctrine is justifiable when one distinguishes the fundamental
issues at hand in an ABOG decertification-the practice of
medicine-and those in National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Tarkanian. ABOG rules for certification apply across the country in
various contexts often involving close concert with state and federal
actors. Tarkanian's due process claim against the NCAA as a state
actor, on the other hand, was essentially bootstrapped, relying on the
happenstance that he was a coach at a state university rather than a
private one. ABOG is more pervasively and consistently entangled
with state action than the controlling Tarkanian case, warranting a
possible expansion of reverse entanglement.
Guidance can be found in similarly situated private medical
associations at common law. A number of jurisdictions have deter-
mined that such associations provide sufficient public goods that they
are held to higher level of scrutiny in their membership decisions
given their "public functions.' 94 The most well known such extension
of public authority into the practice of medicine was Falcone v. Middle-
sex County Medical Society.95 Falcone involved a dispute over whether a
certain Dr. Falcone, a physician licensed to practice by the State of
New Jersey, ought to have been admitted into the Middlesex County
Medical Society. The Medical Society refused his admittance because
he was a doctor of osteopathy (DO) rather than an allopathic physi-
cian (MD). In resolving the dispute, the New Jersey Supreme Court
concluded:
Through its interrelationships, the County Medical Society pos-
sesses, in fact, a virtual monopoly over the use of local hospital facili-
ties. As a result it has power, by excluding Dr. Falcone from
membership, to preclude him from successfully continuing in his
practice of obstetrics and surgery and to restrict patients who wish
to engage him as an obstetrician or surgeon in their freedom of
94 See Note, The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law, 102 HARv. L. REV.
1993, 1997 (1989) ("Similarly, when a professional society such as the American Medi-
cal Association accredits a medical school, or affects a hospital's decisions of whom to
employ, it too assumes a 'public' function. As in the traditional duty-to-serve cases,
the business or association cannot exclude a member of the public absent a 'reasona-
ble' or nonarbitrary basis." (footnotes omitted)). But see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The
Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993, 1010-14 (1930)
(espousing an older view that expulsion from a private association, like a club, is an
action without cognizable legal remedy).
95 170 A.2d 791 (NJ. 1961).
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choice of physicians. Public policy strongly dictates that this power
should not be unbridled but should be viewed judicially as a fiduci-
ary power to be exercised in reasonable and lawful manner for the
advancement of the interests of the medical profession and the pub-
lic generally .... 96
In other words, because of the monopolistic power held by the County
Medical Society, and its service to the public good, 97 it was not free to
discriminate against duly licensed physicians on the "arbitrary"
grounds of whether a medical or osteopathic association accredited
their graduate schools. This departure from the previous general pos-
ture ofjudicial noninterference with the affairs of private associations
has been followed by nine other states. 98
ABOG likewise occupies a unique position in its certification
power, through which it provides a unique public service. As has been
seen, the states license doctors, but the states leave it up to the inde-
pendent specialty organizations, recognized by the American Board of
Medical Specialties, to credential specialty practitioners. 99 This
credentialing forms the basis for establishing competency on both the
supply and demand sides of the medical profession. On the supply
side, credentialing allows hospitals and third-party payers to base their
hiring, privilege, and reimbursement decisions on objective baseline
criteria of training and competence as determined by the boards. On
the demand side, credentialing allows patients with lay knowledge to
rely on the considered opinion of the board when evaluating the basic
competency of a given specialist. Thus, with the proliferation of medi-
96 Id. at 799; see also Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817, 825 (NJ. 1963)
(extending the Falcone doctrine to include also private hospitals).
97 See Falcone, 170 A.2d at 799 ("It must be borne in mind that the County Medi-
cal Society is not a private voluntary membership association with which the public
had little or no concern. It is an association with which the public is highly concerned
and which engages in activities vitally affecting the health and welfare of the
people.").
98 See Hottentot v. Mid-Maine Med. Ctr., 549 A.2d 365, 368 n.4 (Me. 1988). The
Maine Supreme Court declined to follow the Falcone doctrine, in line with the posture
of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Id. at 368-69. I rely on Falcone with
some trepidation, as NewJersey state action decisions are noted for their promiscuous
and anomalous application of public functions to private actors in order to effectuate
policy ends. See, e.g., Cox v. Athens Reg'l Med. Ctr., 279 Ga. App. 586, 593 (2006)
(declining to extend Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 366 A.2d 641, 645 (N.J.
1976) which held that private, nonprofit, nonsectarian hospitals are "quasi-public
institutions" required to provide their facilities for "elective" abortion). Nevertheless,
Falcone predates the subsequent more ambitious rulings by the New Jersey Supreme
Court and the fact that the Falcone doctrine has been followed by numerous other
jurisdictions is notable.
99 See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
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cal specialty fields, quacks and incompetents are kept out of the sup-
ply pool of providers for the benefit of both the specialties themselves,
and also, presumably, for the public at large.' 00 As the boards manage
the credentialing, the state is freed from having to expend its
resources by expanding its licensing protocols to cover specialties as
well.
Thus, while existing caselaw would probably not implicate ABOG
as a state actor, a decertified physician has a plausible claim that
ABOG and other specialty boards are state actors, given the extent of
the reverse entanglement and the public function such boards serve
as regulators of the medical practice. Indeed-not without some
irony-influential legal commentary has marshaled the "public func-
tion" of the medical profession (through the "monopoly" power
afforded to it by the state) as a factor that limits providers' conscience
rights.10 1 Presumably this public function cuts both ways, affecting
not just the physicians who practice in monopoly but also the boards
that oversee it.
III. Is THERE A PROPERTY INTEREST IN MEDICAL PRACTICE?
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion states, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."1 0 2 This Clause provides the basis of the doctrine
of regulatory takings, namely that "changes in legislation or regulation
can trigger takings liability, at least in some instances."'01 3 Or, in other
100 See AM. BD. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, supra note 49, at 38 ("Individuals
who are certified as Diplomates by the Corporation acquire no property right or
vested interest in their certification or in their Diplomate status, the duration, terms,
and conditions of which may be extended, reduced, modified or otherwise changed
as determined by the Board of Directors, in its absolute discretion to assure greater
protection of the public, to recognize knowledge and skills deemed to require further
evaluation or to accommodate legal requirements." (emphasis added)).
101 See R. Alta Charo, The Celestial Fire of Conscience-Refusing to Deliver Medical Care,
352 NEW ENG.J. MED. 2471, 2473 (2005) ("And it is here that licensing systems com-
plicate the equation .... By granting a monopoly, [the states] turn the profession
into a kind of public utility, obligated to provide service to all who seek it. Claiming
an unfettered right to personal autonomy while holding monopolistic control over a
public good constitutes an abuse of the public trust .... "). It is worth noting that
Charo's Celestial Fire is the first source cited by the Ethics Opinion. See ETHICS OPIN-
ION, supra note 1, at 5 n.I.
102 U.S. CONST. amend. V. As the Takings Clause relates to nonfederal actors it is
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits
states from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." Id. amend. XIV.
103 DAVID A. DANA & THoMAs W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 229 (2002).
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words, "[t] he general rule at least is that while property may be regu-
lated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far, it will be recog-
nized as a taking." 10 4 Incumbent upon both the traditional takings
formulation and the established regulatory taking doctrine is that
what is taken is a property interest.
In the case of ABOG decertification, the question then becomes,
does the revocation of an obstetric Certificate constitute the taking of
property in such a way that it implicates the Fifth (and Fourteenth)
Amendment? It clearly is not a taking of real property, as in a "pure
taking" (e.g. the condemnation of a house to build an interstate high-
way), but it does entail a significant loss of value in a medical practice.
I will look at a descriptive question: What kind of property interest is
contained in a medical practice? I will then examine the underlying
normative question: How ought takings doctrine apply to the nonreal
property interests found in a medical practice?
A. Is a Medical Practice Property?
The decertification of an obstetrician involves property interests
in the goodwill of the physician's medical practice. Obviously, the
real property associated with a medical practice is not affected: A
decertified obstetrician retains the lease or ownership interest in the
building that houses her practice. Moreover, even assuming that
there may be a property interest in the obstetrician's professional
degree, the professional degree is not affected. 10 5 What is changed is
the "personal goodwill," which (described in a corporate context)
"exists when the shareholder's reputation, expertise, or contacts gives
the corporation its intrinsic value. It is most likely to be found in
closely held businesses, especially those that are technical, specialized,
or professional in nature or have few customers and suppliers."10 6
The lost property interest is thus in the practice itself, the medical ser-
vices provided by the obstetrician and the business interest those ser-
vices have accrued over the years.
104 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
105 See Margaret F. Brinig, Property Distribution Physics: The Talisman of Time and
Middle Class Law, 31 FAM. L.Q. 93 (1997) (looking at the role of academic degrees and
increased spousal earning power in marital dissolution from a property perspective).
106 Darian M. Ibrahim, The Unique Benefits of Treating Professional Goodwill as Property
in Corporate Acquisitions, 30 DEL.J. CoRP. L. 1, 1 (2005). The type of personal goodwill
found in the case of an obstetric decertification is "professional goodwill." See id. at 9
("Personal goodwill is often found in professional businesses. These businesses are
able to offer unique services due to the advanced education and special skills of their
owners. In this context, personal goodwill is often referred to as 'professional good-
will.'" (footnotes omitted)).
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In the case of a joint practice, the obstetric partner's equity share
in the partnership would not necessarily be implicated by his decertifi-
cation. Nevertheless, the value he brings to the partnership would be
reduced, as would his professional standing. Thus the total profitabil-
ity of the partnership would still be reduced. If all the partners in a
multipractitioner obstetric practice were to face decertification, then
it would be comparable to the situation discussed in the introductory
hypothetical: A total inability of the practice as a whole to achieve its
medical (and business) purpose-namely the practice and provision
of obstetric medicine.
Professional goodwill as a form of property most often appears in
the context of marital dissolutions. In the dissolution context it is
seen as a cognizable form of property, although its value is necessarily
difficult to quantify. 10 7 For example, in In re Marriage of Fortier 08 a
Court of Appeals in California noted that such goodwill in a medical
practice during marital dissolution is different from the expected
earnings of the physician; rather, such goodwill is a cognizable asset to
be divided at time of divorce. 10 9 Likewise, in In re Marriage of Hull,110
the Supreme Court of Montana held "that the goodwill of a profes-
sional anesthesiology practice may be a marital asset subject to prop-
erty division in a marriage dissolution."'u l The Supreme Court of
Montana relied primarily on an earlier decision by the Supreme Court
of Washington, In the Matter of the Marriage of Fleege.112 In Marriage of
Fleege the court held that "lit] he value of goodwill to the professional
spouse, enabling him to continue to enjoy the patronage engendered
107 See Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Valuation of Goodwill in Medical or Dental
Practice for Purposes of Divorce Court's Property Distribution, 78 A.L.R.4th 853 (1990) ("In
the divorce cases that involved sole practitioner physicians ... some courts, in deter-
mining the value of goodwill for purposes of property distribution, have held or
implied that straight capitalization ... capitalization of excess earnings ... fair market
value . . . personal characteristics of the physician ... factors pertaining to the prac-
tice or business . . . and other or unspecified factors and methods . . . were
applicable.").
108 109 Cal. Rptr. 915 (Ct. App. 1973).
109 Id. at 918 ("Therefore, since community goodwill may be evaluated by no
method that is dependent upon the post-marital efforts of either spouse, then, as a
consequence, the value of community goodwill is simply the market value at which
the goodwill could be sold upon dissolution of the marriage, taking into considera-
tion the expectancy of the continuity of the practice.").
110 712 P.2d 1317 (Mont. 1986).
111 Id. at 1321.
112 588 P.2d 1136 (Wash. 1979).
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by that goodwill, constitutes a community asset and should be consid-
ered by the court in distributing the community property."113
On the other hand, in the context of eminent domain or physical
takings, goodwill is generally excluded from the just compensation-
like other consequential damages such as attorney's fees.1 14 Califor-
nia, where most of the cases involving the "taking" of goodwill have
arisen, is an exception in that in 1975 it passed and signed into law
section 1263.510 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 115 That
provision explicitly mandates that "[t]he owner of a business con-
ducted on the property taken, or on the remainder if the property is
part of a larger parcel, shall be compensated for loss of goodwill if the
owner proves [four conditions]. "116 Even here, though, the property
claim is an ancillary one, as one of the conditions upon which the
compensation is predicated reads, "[t]he loss is caused by the taking
of the property or the injury to the remainder."117 Thus, while Cali-
fornia has recognized a compensable property interest in goodwill, it
is not one that stands alone as a constitutionally cognizable claim.1 18
States have some space in which to shape the definition of private
property as it relates to goodwill. On the federal level, the U.S.
Supreme Court has taken "important steps toward developing a fed-
eral constitutional definition of private property" but such steps
113 Id. at 1140.
114 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 51-52 (1985). Epstein does not agree with
this rule: "The injustice-for such it is-of the current rule is widely recognized in the
decided cases and the academic literature. But this broad academic consensus on the
basic point has not been matched by a judicial willingness to overturn established
doctrine." Id. at 53 (footnote omitted); see also City of Oakland v. Pac. Coast Lumber
& Mill Co., 153 P. 705, 707 (1915) ("It is quite within the power of the Legislature to
declare that a damage to that form of property known as business or the good will of a
business shall be compensated for; but, unless the Constitution or the Legislature has
so declared, it is the universal rule of construction that an injury or inconvenience to
a business is damnum absque injuria and does not form an element of the compensat-
ing damages to be awarded.").
115 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.510 (West 2010).
116 Id.; see also Cmty. Redevelopment Agency of L.A. v. Abrams, 543 P.2d 905, 908
(Cal. 1976) (en banc) (refusing to compensate lost goodwill in a relocated pharmacy
because the relocation was forced before the legislature changed the law to allow
goodwill compensation).
117 CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1263.510.
118 See, e.g., Chhour v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency of Buena Park, 53 Cal. Rptr.
2d 585, 587 (Ct. App. 1996) (explaining how the 'judicial stinginess" of not recogniz-
ing goodwill as constitutionally protected property was remedied in California by the
revision to the Code of Civil Procedure); Redevelopment Agency of Emeryville v.
Arvey Corp., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161, 162 (Ct. App. 1992) (noting that the jury in Arvey's
eminent domain litigation had awarded him $225,000 in lost goodwill
compensation).
2011] 1713
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
remain "tentative" and not "complete."' 1 9 As such, "[tihe Supreme
Court has said that in most cases it must defer to state definitions of
what constitutes property for purposes of the federal Constitution's
property guarantees."' 120
Probably most important for evaluating an ABOG decertification,
then, would be the state definition of property in Texas as ABOG's
certification process contains Texas choice-of-law provisions.12 1 Cur-
rently Texas law protects "private real property," defined as "an inter-
est in real property recognized by common law, including a
groundwater or surface water right of any kind, that is not owned by
the federal government, this state, or a political subdivision of this
state," from uncompensated takings.' 2 2 A change in Texas's property
definition to include goodwill (perhaps as California has done, but
ideally as an independent cause of action) would greatly increase the
chances of an ABOG conscience decertification affecting a cognizable
property right.
B. Should a Medical Practice Be Property?
We have seen that the main property interest in a medical prac-
tice at stake in an obstetric decertification is professional goodwill,
and that the justiciability of professional goodwill in a takings context
is murky, at best. Given the paucity of examples of goodwill being
treated as a constitutionally cognizable form of property, we ought to
ask, should it count as such? I conclude that it ought to count as a
recognizable property interest under at least three theoretical
approaches to the issue.
1. Richard Epstein's View
In his influential book, Takings: Private Property and the Power of
Eminent Domain, Richard Epstein argues that distinctions must be
119 DANA & MERRILL, supra note 103, at 68. Dana and Merrill identify clearly the
requirements that property be made of "discrete assets" and contain a "right to
exclude"-and propose a third prong, that the property be "exchangeable on a stand-
alone basis." Id. at 68-81.
120 POLLYJ. PRICE, PROPERTY RIGHTS 137 (2003).
121 See AM. BD. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, supra note 49, at 38 ("In any dispute
of any kind with the [ABOG] or any Person or Entity, such Person or Entity shall be
subject to suit, if at all, only in the County and State where the [ABOG] maintains its
principal place of business and its headquarters, which is currently Dallas, Dallas
County, Texas. Each Person or Entity shall be required and agrees to consent to the
exclusive jurisdiction and venue of courts located in Dallas, Texas and laws of the
State of Texas for the resolution of any and all such disputes.").
122 TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 2007.002 (West 2008).
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made when approaching loss of goodwill. Regardless of one's views
on Epstein's broader (and controversial) argument, his discussion of
goodwill is pertinent here.
Epstein argues that "[t] he economic loss of goodwill as such ... is
never the touchstone of actionability."' 23 This is because loss of good-
will in and of itself can come from various sources-among them, in a
commercial context, "because the owner's performance has slipped or
because his competitors have outdone him or because tastes have
changed"124-which are perfectly reasonable causes for diminution of
goodwill. "[F] orce," on the other hand, is the "forbidden mean [s] ...
that is always decisive on the normative question of entitlement, be it
against a private defendant or against the state. ' 125 Epstein offers a
hypothetical example of such a "forced" destruction of goodwill: a
neighbor who barricades a business next door without trespassing on
the business owner's land. 126
When goodwill is destroyed by force, Epstein argues, the property
owner is owed compensation just as she is for the taking of any other
form of property. In his view, "[f]ar from being vague, goodwill is
something that can be owned, transferred, protected against interfer-
ence by (at the very least) deliberate force and misrepresentation by
third parties, and, of course, taxed."' 27 Thus, "[w]hat possible war-
rant is there then for denying it the status of private property under
the Constitution?"'128 As such, in precluding the presence of goodwill
in a constitutional takings context, "a court must give some indepen-
dent normative account of private property which explains why, and
how, it is permissible to import into the Constitution meanings wholly
at variance with both ordinary and legal conceptions.' 129 Epstein thus
finds even statutory fixes, like that of California,130 insufficient as they
do not protect goodwill to the extent the Constitution ought to; Cali-
fornia in particular "gives no principled reason why the loss of good-
will is compensable only when coupled with dispossession."' 1
123 EPSTEIN, supra note 114, at 81.
124 Id.; see infra Part V.
125 EPSTEIN, supra note 114, at 81-82.
126 See id. at 80-81.
127 Id. at 83.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 84. Epstein does not think that courts have done so. See id. at 82 (noting
that "[t]he intellectual case for compensation of goodwill generally enjoys much
scholarly support" (citing Gideon Kanner, When Is "Property" Not "Property Itself": A
Critical Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation for Loss of Goodwill in Eminent
Domain, 6 CAL. W. L. REv. 57 (1969))).
130 See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
131 EPSTEIN, supra note 114, at 86.
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Epstein's view that the taking of goodwill ought to be compensa-
ble as a matter of constitutional property protection would apply in
the case of an obstetric decertification. The eradication of goodwill in
the case of the decertified obstetrician is not due to economically effi-
cient causes, e.g. incompetence, competition, population shifts,
etc., 132 but rather due to an external organization's interference with
the obstetrician's ability to practice-not unlike the hypothetical
neighbor barricading the entrance to a place of business. 133 This
eradicated goodwill would then be compensable in and of itself, with-
out a requisite dispossession first (as required by California).134
2. Liberty and Decisional Property Rights
Why do we protect private property and do those reasons impli-
cate obstetric goodwill? This broader normative question involves the
purposes underlying the constitutional property rights protected by
the Fifth Amendment. 3 5 At its most basic level "[p]roperty is seen as
a bulwark which protects material wealth, liberty, and autonomy."'136
132 See infra Part IV.
133 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
134 Because Epstein is describing pure state action, it is unclear what the remedy
would be under his system for a private entity acting in a public function as ABOG
could be. This perhaps points to another potential ground for action, namely that
ABOG would be liable to the decertified physician under private law for tortious inter-
ference in his practice. That is beyond the scope of this Note, however.
135 I do not argue that this set of considerations should necessarily have interpre-
tive force in a constitutional context, as that is a separate question of constitutional
interpretation which cannot be resolved here. Compare RONALD DWORJN, TAING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 135-36 (1977) (arguing that difficult constitutional questions
should refer to the "concepts" underlying "vague" clauses-"like legality, equality, and
cruelty"-and not "conceptions" of them; or in other words that we should focus on
what a clause "means," not what I, or the Founders, or Ronald Dworkin say it means
(emphasis added)), and STEPHEN BREYER, AcrrvE LIBERTY 76-84 (2005) (evaluating
competing interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause-"one color-blind, one pur-
posive"-in the context of affirmative action in college and law school admissions),
with Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 823, 832 (1986) ("For the subject of economic rights ... we must turn
away from the glamor [sic] of abstract philosophic discourse and back to the mun-
dane and difficult task of discovering what the Framers were trying to accomplish with
the Contract Clause and the Takings Clause.").
136 LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY 1 (2003); see also JEDEDLAH
PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY 9 (2010) (noting in a historical survey that among
"jurists and reformers" of the eighteenth century "property promised to integrate the
most important qualities of personal freedom, the signal value of the modern world").
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In this sense property is seen as a right to a thing (in rem) ,137 which
carries with it what can be termed decisional rights-namely the
owner of the thing has the right to decide what she does or does not
do with the thing.138 Incumbent upon such rights are duties, duties
which protect the interests of the right-bearer. 139
Thus, in a sense, the protection of private property in law is a
burden upon the other (typically, all others) to respect the decision-
making authority of the right-holder vis-d-vis his property. In so
doing, the broader liberty and autonomy of the right-holder are
respected-not merely the narrow right to the "thing." This respect
applies particularly to the goodwill property of the obstetrician facing
decertification: The protection of the obstetrician's goodwill gives her
the right to practice medicine as she sees fit in keeping with the dic-
tates of her conscience, and imposing a duty on others (here ABOG)
not to interfere with that decisional right.
3. Liberty and In Personam Property Rights
A contemporary approach to property rights implicates similar
overarching goals of protecting liberty and in some ways serves to clar-
ify them as they relate to goodwill. This contemporary approach to
property understands property as a "bundle of sticks" or a "bundle of
rights" with no one stick or right being essential for calling some inter-
est "property."140
While the distinction between a right to the thing and the "bun-
dle of rights" view is not always a clear one-or at least the distinction
137 See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in
Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 360-66 (2001) (presenting an account of the
"traditional" (in rem) approach to property law).
138 See UNDERKUFFLER supra note 136, at 17 (positing a "particular land-based
power" of the property owner-"the right of a title holder to use his land in the way
that he, in his discretion, desires"-and referencing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992)); see also JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 47
(1988) ("Ownership, as we have seen, expresses the abstract idea of an object being
correlated with the name of some individual, in relation to a rule which says that
society will uphold that individual's decision as final when there is any dispute about
how the object should be used.").
139 SeeJ.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 13 (1997) ("The essential claim
[Joseph] Raz makes is that a person is the bearer of a right when a duty is imposed in
order to serve or protect his interest." (citing Joseph Raz, On the Nature of Rights, 93
MIND 194, 195 (1984))).
140 PRICE, supra note 120, at 138 ("The Supreme Court generally considers prop-
erty not to be limited to objects that a person may possess but to be anything to which
a bundle of rights attaches .... ").
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is not entirely essential for understanding one or the otherl 41-look-
ing at the specific interests held by the owner starts to bring forward a
fairly definite series of rights or powers. 142  One helpful (but
inexhaustive) list of these rights and powers includes "claim-rights to
possess, use, manage, and receive income; the powers to transfer,
waive, exclude, and abandon; the liberties to consume or destroy;
immunity from expropriation; the duty not to use harmfully; and lia-
bility for execution to satisfy a court judgment."'143 Such a mode of
evaluating the reality of ownership seems compatible with Epstein's
justification for protecting goodwill-given that he cites its transfera-
bility, ability to be protected, and its ability to be taxed as ways of
understanding how it is property.' 44
Applying obstetric goodwill to the list above, we see that the own-
ership of it includes possession (it is the physician's goodwill), use and
management (she decides when to work), receipt of income (income
is the basis for private medical practice), power to transfer (a practice
can be sold), power to exclude (one practitioner does not need to
admit another to her practice, nor does she need to see every
patient), right to abandon (obstetricians retire), immunity from
expropriation, the duty not to use harmfully (you cannot practice bad
medicine), and liability for execution to satisfy a court judgment
(practice goodwill can be divided by a court as a marital asset). Thus,
although practice goodwill is not a tangible thing to be grasped, it has
adhering to it a "bundle of rights" that can make it property in a cog-
nizable sense, for, "[i]f a person has all of these incidents [described
above], or most of them, with respect to a certain thing, then he or
she owns it.''I45
141 See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 28 (Walter
Wheeler Cook ed., Yale Univ. Press 2000) (1919) ("Sometimes ['property'] is
employed to indicate the physical object to which various legal rights, privileges, etc.,
relate; then again-with far greater discrimination and accuracy-the word is used to
denote the legal interest (or aggregate of legal relations) appertaining to such a physi-
cal object.").
142 See id. at 51 ("Many examples of legal powers may readily be given. Thus, X,
the owner of ordinary personal property 'in a tangible object' has the power to extin-
guish his own legal interest (rights, powers, immunities, etc.) through that totality of
operative facts known as abandonment; and-simultaneously and correlatively-to
create in other persons privileges and powers relating to the abandoned object,-e.g.,
the power to acquire title to the latter by appropriating it. Similarly, X has the power
to transfer his interest to Y ...." (footnote omitted)).
143 STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 22 (1990) (citing A.M. Honor6,
Ownership, in OXFORo ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961)).
144 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
145 MUNZER, supra note 143, at 220.
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Some of the rights that adhere to obstetric goodwill, in particular
the rights to use and exclude, implicate the basic liberty purpose of
protected property seen above. At issue in the case of an abortion-
related ABOG decertification is the right of an obstetrician to use his
medical practice in a manner consistent with, among other things, his
conscience and his professional estimation of his patient's health in
order to exclude others from demanding its use in a manner contrary
to those considerations. Thus, preserving his right to property-and
those "sticks" in the attendant "bundle"-preserves not the thing but
his freedom of action with the thing as it applies to other people.
Incidentally, this freedom of action also coincides with traditional
standards of physician autonomy in medical ethics, 146 making these
rights all the more essential to a proper understanding of medical
goodwill, and all the more necessary to protect.
IV. REGULATORY TAKINGS
If ABOG's public functions constitute state action, and if the phy-
sician's certification and attendant professional goodwill constitute a
constitutional property interest, the question remaining is whether
decertification constitutes a taking.
A. Background on Regulatory Taking
Takings doctrine has its origins in the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, which states, "nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.' ' 4 7 In its "pure form" tak-
ings doctrine applies to the issue of physical takings. 148 In this context
there are two primary components to doctrine under the Takings
Clause: That the government must provide 'lust compensation" for a
taking, and that the taking must be "for public use." Takings doctrine
applies to actions by the federal government through the Fifth
Amendment and to actions by state governments either through the
Fourteenth Amendment 149  or under the auspices of state
constitutions.150
146 See supra Part III.B.2.
147 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
148 See EPSTEIN, supra note 114, at 50.
149 See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
150 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 103, at 2 ("The Supreme Court generally has
employed the same standards in assessing takings claims without regard to whether
the action is brought against the federal government under the Fifth Amendment or
against a State under the Fourteenth. In addition, all state constitutions (except
North Carolina's) include takings clauses .... ").
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Although originally restricted to eminent domain and physical
takings, the Supreme Court's takings doctrine has since expanded to
counteract other regulatory encroachments on private property in the
exercise of state police power.' 5 1 The seminal case in this regard,
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,15 2 involved a Pennsylvania law that
restricted the mining of anthracite coal in such a way as to "destroy
previously existing rights of property and contract."'153 While he
noted that "[ g]overnment hardly could go on" if forced to pay for
every alteration to property values due to "change in the general law,"
Justice Holmes nevertheless concluded that the police power must
have its limits, otherwise "the contract and due process clauses are
gone."' 54
B. Analysis of Reulatory Takings
The takings doctrine potentially implicated by the loss of good-
will due to a decertification by ABOG is an ad hoc regulatory tak-
ing.' 55 The doctrinal framework has its roots in Pennsylvania Coal, but
the Supreme Court articulated the modern standard in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York. 1 56 There, in concluding that a histori-
cal preservation law did not constitute a taking, the Supreme Court
enunciated a three-part test for a regulatory taking: (1) the extent of
the diminution of value of the property in question; (2) the reasona-
ble investment-backed expectations of the owner; and (3) "the charac-
ter of the governmental action."'1 57
151 See id. at 4 ("Although originally confined to exercises of eminent domain, the
Supreme Court eventually extended the Takings Clause beyond that context....
[T]he Court recognized that sometimes a police power regulation has an impact
functionally equivalent to an exercise of eminent domain.").
152 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
153 Id. at 413.
154 See id.
155 Regulatory takings can also be of a categorical nature. Current Supreme Court
doctrine for a categorical regulatory taking requires either a permanent physical pres-
ence in the property in question, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982), or a complete destruction of all value of the property, see
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The facts of an ABOG decertifi-
cation do not implicate either test for a categorical taking.
156 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
157 Id. at 124; see also Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225
(1986) (applying the three-part test to a nonphysical taking).
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1. Extent of Diminution
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Penn Central, found
that the extent to which the regulation in question interfered with a
property value was a factor to be considered in a takings analysis. Jus-
tice Brennan noted that diminution of value alone could not consti-
tute a taking when the regulation is "reasonably related to the general
welfare. 15  Nevertheless, citing Pennsylvania Coal, he maintained that
an analysis of Penn Central's takings claim required the Court to "con-
sider whether the interference with appellants' property is of such a
magnitude that 'there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain [it].""u 59 The Court concluded that even
with the restrictions on building, Penn Central would still be able to
profit from Grand Central Terminal (as they had for years) and so any
diminution of value claims were not well supported.160
In the case of an ABOG decertification there would clearly be a
diminution of an obstetric practice's goodwill value. While it would
certainly vary from case to case as to the particular extent of the dimi-
nution, the adverse effect decertification would have on hospital staff
and admitting privileges alone would in most cases constitute a
severe-if not total 16 1-reduction of the value of a solo obstetric prac-
tice as it renders close to valueless the particular expertise of the pro-
fessional. 162 Likewise, decertification would reduce the effectiveness
and professional desirability of a given obstetrician in a partnership
practice-even if her partners retained their Diplomate status and
admitting privileges-by reducing her professional reputation and
thus her professional goodwill, 16 3 thereby reducing the total value of
158 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131 ("Appellants concede that the decisions sustaining
other land-use regulations, which, like the New York City law, are reasonably related
to the promotion of the general welfare, uniformly reject the proposition that dimi-
nution in property value, standing alone, can establish a 'taking' .... ).
159 Id. at 136 (alteration in original) (quoting Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413).
160 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136 ("So the law does not interfere with what must be
regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel.
More importantly, on this record, we must regard the New York City law as permitting
Penn Central not only to profit from the Terminal but also to obtain a 'reasonable
return' on its investment.").
161 See, e.g., BYLAws OF THE MED. STAFF, MEM'L Hosp. OF SOUTH BEND § 3.1-1(c)
(2009) ("An applicant [to the Medical Staff] must be board certified and/or sub-
specialty certified by the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS) .... "); see
also Michael Leavitt, Physician Conscience III, LEArTr PARTNERS (Aug. 21, 2008), http:/
/leavittpartners.com/blog/physician-conscience-blog-iii ("Physician certification is a
powerful instrument. Without it, a doctor cannot practice the specialty.").
162 See Ibrahim, supra note 106, at 7-10 (surveying various types of goodwill).
163 See id. at 11.
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the practice. Decertification can also affect adversely the ability of a
practitioner to be reimbursed by third parties, such as health insurers,
thus driving down the available supply of paying patients and revenues
from insurance reimbursement.1 64 This would yield a very significant
loss of practice value on the part of a decertified obstetrician, thus
clearly meeting the diminution prong of the analysis.
2. Investment-Backed Expectations
The Court in Penn Central concluded that diminution of value
claims must also be evaluated in the context of the reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations of the property owners. That is, how do
the given regulations interfere with the prospective economic activity
of the claimant?165 Indeed, the Court noted that in previous cases it
had found that interference in economic activities not sufficiently
connected to reasonable expectations was not justiciable in a takings
context. 166 Justice Brennan clarified, however, that this factor was an
issue in Pennsylvania Coal for, in that case, the Kohler Act frustrated
the reasonable investment expectations of the claimants to the anthra-
cite coal mining rights.167 By contrast, in Penn Central, Brennan
concludes,
[Grand Central Terminal's] designation as a landmark not only per-
mits but contemplates that appellants may continue to use the prop-
erty precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years: as a railroad
terminal containing office space and concessions. So the law does
not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary
expectation concerning the use of the parcel.168
164 See, e.g., Sources Used for Horizon NJ Health Provider Directory, HoRIZON NJ
HEALTH, http://www.horizonnjhealth.com/misc/pdnjhglossary.html (last visited
May 28, 2011) ("We check specialty board certification before a physician joins our
network and at least every three years after that or more often according to state or
federal requirements.").
165 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 ("The economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.").
166 See id. at 124-25 ("A second are the decisions in which this Court has dismissed
'taking' challenges on the ground that, while the challenged government action
caused economic harm, it did not interfere with interests that were sufficiently bound
up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute 'property' for Fifth
Amendment purposes.").
167 See id. at 127.
168 Id. at 136.
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Thus, the Court held that preventing further construction on the
Grand Central parcel did not frustrate any reasonable investment-
backed expectations of the owners.
An obstetrician has the expectation in building his practice that
he will be able to do so in a manner consistent with his conscientious
beliefs and his legitimate, autonomous practice of medicine. ABOG
decertification, based upon the ethical norms of the Ethics Opinion,
frustrates both of these expectations. An obstetrician practicing today
would be practicing medicine as a result of numerous personal and
financial investments dating back (in most cases) decades: from the
cost of college and medical school, to reduced earning power during
a lengthy postgraduate residency, to capital invested either in estab-
lishing a solo practice or in buying equity in an existing practice. Also
involved are significant opportunity costs, as this time and money were
spent in the pursuit of the goal of practicing obstetrics and not any
variety of other potential, lucrative fields such as business, law, or
other types of medicine. In the case of a practicing obstetrician who
neither performs nor refers for abortion, these considerable invest-
ments would have been made relying on the traditional canons of
medical ethics1 69 and traditional legal protections of physicians' con-
sciences. 170 Thus, a regulatory action by ABOG against a practicing
obstetrician who violates the new proposed norms of ethical behavior
would not only constitute a severe diminution of the value of his medi-
cal practice but it would do this contrary to the expectations based on
reasonable (and previously established) rules on which the obstetri-
cian had relied in investing time, talent, and capital for many years.
A decertification on conscience grounds can be easily distin-
guished in this context from a decertification for incompetence (or
felony conviction or whatever other established grounds for decertifi-
cation might be given). No one becomes an obstetrician relying on
the ability to practice incompetently. Likewise, specialty boards
clearly have the authority to maintain their membership in line with
certain established standards of professional competence. Those stan-
dards, however, neither encompass the abrogation of practitioners'
conscience rights nor the imposition of a particular controversial con-
ception of a given patient's health and wellbeing.
The physician's autonomy in achieving the medical best interests
of his patient is otherwise accepted by ACOG's Committee on Ethics.
For example, if a healthy patient requests an "elective" cesarean sec-
tion while exhibiting no factors that might indicate one medically,
169 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
170 See supra Part I.C.1.
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must her obstetrician comply? The answer invariably relies on the
physician's studied (and autonomous) application of his professional
knowledge to the situation at hand with an eye toward maximizing the
positive health outcomes of the patient. Here, that could mean either
that her health outcomes would be better served by a cesarean sec-
tion, or that they would not-not that these considerations must sim-
ply yield to the patient's desires. ACOG supports this view, saying in a
Committee on Ethics Opinion,
If the physician believes that cesarean delivery promotes the overall
health and welfare of the woman and her fetus more than vaginal
delivery, he or she is ethically justified in performing a cesarean
delivery. Similarly, if the physician believes that performing a
cesarean delivery would be detrimental to the overall health and
welfare of the woman and her fetus, he or she is ethically obliged to
refrain from performing the surgery. 17
1
ACOG does not present any arguments distinguishing this accepted
exercise in physicians' autonomy from any parallel decision by an
obstetrician that abortion is "detrimental to the overall health and
welfare of the woman and her fetus." Thus, an obstetrician should be
justified in relying on such considerations of professional autonomy in
arranging his professional practice.
3. Character of Government Action
It is also necessary to look at the "character" of the government
action. As Justice Brennan wrote in Penn Central, "[i]n deciding
whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this
Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the
nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a
whole .... "172 Among the salient considerations in evaluating the
character of government actions are problems of arbitrariness 17- and
discrimination. 174 Also, harkening back to Pennsylvania Coal, the
Court acknowledged that the equity of any distribution of benefits and
171 COMM. ON ETHICS, AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, AGOG
COMM. Op. No. 395, SURGERY AND PATIENT CHOICE (2008), available at http://www.
acog.org/from-home/publications/ethics/co395.pdf.
172 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31.
173 See id. at 132-33 ("But, in any event, a landmark owner has a right to judicial
review of any Commission decision, and, quite simply, there is no basis whatsoever for
a conclusion that courts will have any greater difficulty identifying arbitrary or dis-
criminatory action in the context of landmark regulation than in the context of classic
zoning or indeed in any other context.").
174 See id. at 132 ("[C]ontrary to appellants' suggestions, landmark laws are not
like discriminatory.. . zoning").
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burdens generated by the regulation are salient concerns when evalu-
ating the character of the action. 175 The Court, however, acquiesced
to the fact that "legislation designed to promote the general welfare
commonly burdens some more than others."'176 It concluded that the
thirty one historical districts and over four hundred individual
landmarks sufficiently dispersed the burdens of the regulation so as to
make the character of the action permissible. 177
Evaluating the character of such an action by ABOG is somewhat
more difficult than evaluating diminutions of value and investment-
backed expectations. On one hand, an ABOG decertification of a
pro-life obstetrician might be construed as a regulation for the gen-
eral welfare-the ostensible good health of women seeking certain
reproductive health services-and one that affects all obstetric special-
ists. Given ABOG's established procedures, arbitrariness may not be a
pressing concern. 178 Likewise, the burdens of decertification seem to
apply to all obstetricians who do not follow the generally applicable
rules. 79
The rules themselves, however, are problematic in terms of dis-
crimination and equitable dispersal of benefits. Given that an ABOG
decertification on conscience grounds would be grounded in the ethi-
cal norms set out in the Ethics Opinion, its stated purposes are what
should control any putative regulatory action by ABOG. The Ethics
Opinion makes it abundantly clear that, with respect to this provision,
its concern is only ostensibly the obstetric specialty as a whole, and the
focus is actually on those obstetricians who have conscientious objec-
tions to procedures such as abortion.18 ° Similarly, the benefits of the
Ethics Opinion would be less widespread than they might seem. The
175 See id. at 133 ("It follows, [claimants] argue, that New York City's law is inher-
ently incapable of producing the fair and equitable distribution of benefits and bur-
dens of governmental action which is characteristic of zoning laws and historic-district
legislation and which they maintain is a constitutional requirement if 'just compensa-
tion' is not to be afforded.").
176 Id.
177 See id. at 134.
178 See AM. BD. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, supra note 49, at 7 (explaining that
some procedural avenues are available in a Certificate revocation).
179 One might say, to paraphrase Anatole France, that the Ethics Opinion, in its
"majestic equality[,] ... forbid[s]" pro-life and pro-choice alike from refusing to per-
form abortions. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (Winifred Stephens trans., John
Lane Co. 1908) (1894).
180 "[S] ome providers claim a right to refuse to provide certain services, refuse to
refer patients to another provider for these services, or even decline to inform
patients of their existing options... " ETHICS OPINION, supra note 1, at 1 (emphasis
added).
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concern of the Ethics Opinion is access to abortion services. However,
in compelling all obstetricians potentially to perform abortions, the
Ethics Opinion neglects to benefit (and indeed burdens) women who,
out of religious, moral, or medical conviction would prefer to see an
obstetrician who does not perform abortions. 8 1 The Ethics Opinion
does not provide any compelling reason why one segment of the pop-
ulation (those who seek abortions) should be preferred and benefit-
ted over another (those who actively avoid abortions).
V. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
I now turn to certain additional considerations that may be rele-
vant in a property-based analysis of physicians' conscience claims.
A. An "Undue Burden" on Reproductive Freedom?
While this Note examines an ABOG abortion ethics decertifica-
tion from a property rights perspective, given the broader reproduc-
tive-rights context in which such an action would take place, any court
adjudicating such a case would need at least to consider the permissi-
bility of a decertification in the broader context of reproductive
freedom.
While the full jurisprudence of abortion and reproductive free-
dom, stretching back to Doe v. Bolton,182 Roe v. Wade,1 8 3 Eisenstadt v.
181 A Gallup Poll recently found that forty-seven percent of the country identifies
as "pro-life" (versus forty-five percent identifying as "pro-choice"). Abortion, GALLUP
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx (last visited May 28, 2011). It is not
unreasonable to suppose that a very substantial percentage of those so identifying are
women, and that many of those women would prefer to have a physician practicing in
the intimate sphere of their lives relating to abortion and childbirth to share their
convictions. Likewise, imagine an older woman having her first (and probably only)
child deciding, as a matter of personal medical preference, to see a physician who in
his autonomous practice of medicine does not view abortion as a valid standard of
medical care because such a physician might prioritize the healthy delivery of the
baby at all costs, in keeping with the desires of the hypothetical mother, even at the
expense of taking risks with her health a pro-choice obstetrician might not. The abil-
ity for women to choose between alternative (if not competing) approaches to medi-
cal care does not seem to be an irrelevant concern, and the Ethics Opinion would
severely constrain such an ability by forcing all obstetricians to comply with one con-
ception of obstetric care-namely one that condones abortion. See, e.g., Treatment
Philosophy, GIANNA, http://www.giannahealth.org (last visited May 28, 2011) (explain-
ing why the New York City Gianna Center for Women's overtly Catholic approach to
reproductive medicine can yield distinct and potentially desirable reproductive health
outcomes-here solutions to infertility).
182 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
183 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Baird,'84 and Griswold v. Connecticut,185 is beyond the scope of this
Note, the 1992 Supreme Court decision Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey' 6 presents salient questions regarding the
so-called "undue burden" test. According to the plurality in Casey,
"[n]umerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental
effect of increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of medical
care, whether for abortion or any other medical procedure.' 1 8 7 It
continues, "[o]nly where State regulation imposes an undue burden
on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the state
reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause."188
Noting that past "undue burden" standards have lacked consis-
tency, the Court attempts to clarify its meaning, explaining, "[a] find-
ing of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."'189
As to the "effect" analysis, the plurality states "a statute which, while
furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state inter-
est, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman's choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving
its legitimate ends."' 9 0
Abortion rights advocates have long insisted that access to physi-
cians willing and able to perform abortions is a serious concern in
certain communities. In some parts of the country (particularly the
upper midwest), doctors willing to perform abortions are sufficiently
rare that abortionists are sometimes flown in to service the local popu-
lation.' 9 ' It is presumably such situations that the Ethics Opinion has
in mind when it notes,
184 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
185 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
186 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
187 Id. at 874 (plurality opinion).
188 Id.
189 Id. at 877.
190 Id. But see id. at 985 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The shortcomings of Roe [v.
Wade] did not include lack of clarity: Virtually all regulation of abortion before the
third trimester was invalid. But to come across this phrase in the joint opinion-
which calls upon federal districtjudges to apply an 'undue burden' standard as doubt-
ful in application as it is unprincipled in origin-is really more than one should have
to bear.").
191 See Jack Hitt, Who Will Do Abortions Here?, in THE ETHICS OF ABORTION 45, 45
(Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 3d ed. 2001) ("At one point last year,
[the abortion doctor] was touching down in Minnesota, North Dakota, Wisconsin,
and Indiana. In the trade, these new frequent-flier docs are called 'circuit riders.'
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[c] onscientious refusals that undermine access should raise signifi-
cant caution. Providers with moral or religious objections should
either practice in proximity to individuals who do not share their
views or ensure that referral processes are in place so that patients
have access to the service that the physician does not wish to
provide.192
One could therefore argue that in certain (rare) populations a physi-
cian's refusal to perform an abortion (without adequate alternative
provisioning for the procedure in place) would effectively prevent a
woman from being able to procure one without traveling a long dis-
tance at considerable expense. A court might consider this a "substan-
tial obstacle" depending on the circumstances, and thus qualifying as
an "undue burden."
Yet, Casey's undue burden test applies to state action, which, in
the context of this analysis, is potentially implicated by the decertify-
ing body (ABOG), not the claimant obstetrician. It seems no small
stretch to hold that the Casey standard requires state action in order to
fend off an undue burden to reproductive rights; that is, that the Con-
stitution requires ABOG to act against obstetricians who would not
perform abortions in underserved populations. Such a posture would
contradict the long-standing holding of the Supreme Court that the
right to abortion is "negative" and not "positive."193
On the other hand, it is unlikely that any decertification would be
litigated on property rights grounds alone, with claimants also making
claims based, inter alia, on various statutory provisions and regula-
tions.1 94 Undue burden questions could potentially complicate con-
science claims derived from the Hyde-Weldon Amendment or its
corresponding regulations, as these provisions rely on government
regulation of medical practice in the manner envisioned by Casey.'9 5
In this respect, there is a potential advantage of a property-based con-
science claim by a decertified physician: It shifts the state action
They are proof of two things: that the medical infrastructure undergirding the right
to an abortion is strained to the breaking point and that the practical reality of abor-
tion is retreating into a half-lighted ghetto of pseudonyms, suspicion, and fear[.]").
192 ETHICS OPINION, supra note 1, at 5.
193 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (holding that the constitu-
tional right to abortion does not implicate a constitutional entitlement to abortions
through federal health expenditures). But see Maureen Kramlich, The Abortion Debate
Thirty Years Later: From Choice to Coercion, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 783, 783-84 (2004)
(presenting the legal efforts following Roe to change the basic question of abortion
rights "from 'choice' to 'access'").
194 See supra Part I.C.1-2.
195 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. G, tit. V
§ 508, 121 Stat. 1844, 2209.
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inquiry from the government protecting his conscience to the profes-
sional body violating it. His claim is thus freed from its reliance on
federal and state legislation and thus possible negative treatment at
the hands of Casey. Even if a decision upholding his property-and
thus conscience-rights has the prospective effect of "burdening"
women seeking abortions, this would be due to his private actions and
choices and not government regulations.
B. ABOG Decertification and Physician Shortages
Another consideration is the effect of ABOG decertification on
the supply of physicians and, in particular, obstetric specialists. The
enforcement of obstetric ethics norms that would require the per-
formance of, or referral for, abortions would effectively exclude from
the practice of obstetric medicine to a substantial percentage of the
population that either identifies as pro-life in such a way as to refuse
complicity in abortion or otherwise would prefer not to perform abor-
tions or participate in the abortion process) 96 While the precise per-
centage is unknown, the effect itself is not: By erecting a new barrier
to entry into the practice of obstetric medicine-a pro-choice
approach to abortion-ABOG decertification for conscientious objec-
tion would reduce the supply of obstetric physicians. A reduced sup-
ply, coupled with a static or increased demand, will result in a
shortage of obstetricians.
Our shortage of physician is already a problem, affecting some
communities more severely than others, and is expected to grow
worse. The shortage will be more problematic even without any of the
supply reductions that are likely to occur as a result of decertifying
existing obstetricians who refuse to perform abortions and deterring
future obstetricians who will choose a different career or specialty
rather than violate their consciences. While physician shortages have
been most acute in the field of primary care,' 97 they are predicted to
196 Some opponents of conscience rights for healthcare providers see the exclu-
sion of these populations from medical practice as a desirable goal. See supra notes
38-39 and accompanying text.
197 See Andy Kroll, The Doctor Can't See You Now, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 5, 2009),
http://motherjones.com/politics/2009/10/doctor-cant-see-you-now ("If primary-
care medicine in the US were a patient, its diagnosis would be grim. The first
responders to illness and pain, who can spot and treat chronic conditions in their
early stages, primary-care doctors are in greater demand each year. In 2006, just more
than 250,000 primary-care doctors practiced in the US-by some estimates, that was
about several thousand to more than 7,000 less than the demand.").
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grow in both primary care1 9 8 and specialties1 99 and have already been
felt in obstetrics. 20 0 Though the causes of these current and probable
shortages are manifold, crowding out pro-life individuals from obstet-
ric practice would surely exacerbate this problem. The nature and
extent of this disruption would be a salient concern for any court
adjudicating a decertification.
Furthermore, such potential reductions in the supply of obstetri-
cians should be of particular concern, given the underlying objectives
of current healthcare reform measures. As President Obama's Office
of Management and Budget noted, "[t]he Administration will explore
all serious ideas that, in a fiscally responsible manner, achieve the
common goals of constraining [healthcare] costs, expanding access,
and improving quality."201 A reduction in the supply of obstetricians
will, by definition, restrict access and presumably increase costs as the
supply diminishes. Likewise, even if an obstetrician decides to recer-
tify in another specialty or practice generally, such a restructuring fur-
ther disrupts the supply of physicians by imposing transition costs as
the obstetrician retrains and opportunity costs given the obstetrician's
potential to continue practicing in his or her chosen specialty. These
outcomes are not consistent with stated goals of constraining costs,
increasing access, and improving quality.
198 See Veronica Nett, Health Reform May Cause State Doctor Shortage, Council Says,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, July 15, 2010, http://wvgazette.com/News/201007150896
(reporting that the effects of federal healthcare reform will cause demand for primary
care to outstrip supply in West Virginia).
199 See ASS'N OF AM. MED. COLLS., PHYSICIAN SHORTAGES TO WORSEN WITHOUT
INCREASES IN RESIDENCY TRAINING 1 (2010), available at https://www.aamc.org/
download/150584/data/physician-shortagesfactsheet.pdf ("[B]y 2020 our nation
will face a serious shortage of both primary care and specialist physicians to care for
an aging and growing population. According to the [Association of American Medical
Colleges] Center for Workforce Studies, there will be 45,000 too few primary care
physicians-and a shortage of 46,000 surgeons and medical specialists-in the next
decade.").
200 See Megan Miller, Solution for Garrett OB/GYN Shortage, at Least Temporarily, CUM-
BERLAND TIMES-NEws, Mar. 11, 2010, http://times-news.com/local/xl745491135/
Solution-for-Garrett-OB-GYN-shortage-at-least-temporarily (reporting on a severe mal-
practice-based shortage in obstetric specialists in rural Garrett County, Maryland);
Rita Rubin, Putting a Face on Malpractice Insurance Debate, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 2003,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2003-03-04-malpractice-debatex.htm (not-
ing that the increasing costs of malpractice insurance are forcing some obstetrician-
gynecologists to abandon the obstetric sides of their practices).
201 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY 27 (2009), available
at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fylO O/pdf/fyl O-newera.pdf.
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CONCLUSION
The conscience rights of physicians, obstetricians in particular,
have become a point of legal and political contention in recent years.
This debate will likely extend into at least the near future given the
indeterminacy and fluctuation in current statute and regulations as
well as the funding and mandate changes in recent healthcare reform
legislation. Central to these conflicts are the American Board of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists. The latter still adheres to an ethical opin-
ion mandating that obstetric specialists perform or refer for abortions,
regardless of their conscientious objections, while the former just
recently reaffirmed the use of "ethics rules" from the College in evalu-
ating whether or not to maintain the certification of a specialist.
If ABOG were to decertify an obstetrician for not performing or
referring for an abortion, as indicated by current ACOG guidelines, it
is possible that the obstetrician would have a plausible claim against
ABOG for taking the goodwill property that constituted the obstetri-
cian's medical practice. Such a claim would almost certainly be in
addition to the wide array of potential (but largely untested) legal
claims based on a combination of statutory provisions, executive regu-
lations, and other constitutional provisions, including, the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the First Amendment.
In the hypothetical presented at the outset, we are now able to say
with greater certainty what the hypothetical obstetrician's takings
claim would look like. Under the traditional test for regulatory tak-
ings, his argument would be strong: His medical practice would be
nearly valueless, representing a high diminution of value; the diminu-
tion would be contrary to his investment-backed expectations, expec-
tations previously endorsed within medical ethics, to be able to
practice in a manner consistent with one's conscience and the action
would have been inequitable and prejudicial against a particular seg-
ment of the specialty-pro-life practitioners.
It is less clear that ABOG is a joint participant in state action and
that goodwill property meets the constitutional definition of property
for a takings claim. While finding that ABOG is implicated in state
action would be an extension of current doctrine, it would not be one
without justification, given the degree of entanglement between pri-
vate medical actors and all levels of government, as well as the long-
standing view that the medical profession-including its boards and
societies-serve a public function. Likewise, while federal courts have
yet to address whether a medical practice constitutes "property" for
constitutional purposes, many states have recognized goodwill as
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property. Indeed, nothing prevents a state from designating goodwill
as a cognizable property interest, and any such determination at the
federal level would not be inconsistent with either current takings
doctrine or a well-ordered conception of property.
Regardless of the merits of the claim, a property-based analysis of
obstetricians' conscience rights highlights an underappreciated real-
ity: that a practicing physician's interest in business goodwill-encom-
passing the professional expectations on which the practice was built
as well as the exclusionary and decisional rights the practice involves
it-demands a robust protection of the right to conscientious objec-
tion and legitimate professional autonomy. Furthermore, this prop-
erty perspective highlights the high transition costs inherent in a
regime of decertification on conscience grounds-including loss of
goodwill, physicians practicing outside their established specialties,
and crowding out potential obstetricians on the supply side. The
result of such decertification without adequate protection of con-
science or property would be to diminish the supply of obstetricians to
increase the costs of medical care, both of which are orthogonal to the
accepted goals of healthcare reform to increase access and lower
costs.
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